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ABSTRACT
Drones have entered American consciousness and society. Little attention, however, has
been paid to how America got here, how it became a drone nation. This thesis seeks to counter
the “New Drone” misconception, the general ignorance of drone history present in the
historiography, and popular perception of the subject.
Chapter one, “The “New Drone” Misconception: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the
World Wars,” examines America’s first experiments with military drones. Charles Kettering,
“Hap” Arnold, and Reginald Denny were among the first to recognize UAV potential and garner
American support. The main motivation for drone use--removing American soldiers from
danger--was first recognized during this period. These overlooked early drones suggest that
contemporary parallels, such as imprecision and civilian casualties, are not new.
Chapter two, “The ‘Inevitability’ of Drones and the Cold War” questions the inevitability
of drone adoption. Such perceived inevitability creates a futuristic image, with connotations of
superiority leading to blanket acceptance. Examining drone development during the Cold War
reveals a very different reality. Drones faced major obstacles, including technical limitations,
expense, and competition from other emerging technologies.
Just as drone technology is not new, neither are the facile policies which guide its use.
Chapter three, “American Counterinsurgency: The Phoenix Program in Vietnam and
Contemporary Drone Policy,” is a comparative analysis of American counterinsurgency efforts.
The integration of drone strikes into counterinsurgency efforts, especially in unofficial war zones
such as Pakistan, has led to popular interest and concern. Many of the same problems
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(inefficiency, civilian casualties, corruption, and public outrage) that plague drone use also
haunted America’s efforts with the Phoenix program.
Because of the potential drones hold today, careful consideration of their problematic
history is essential. Protecting Americans from war by replacing soldiers with drones has been a
century long effort. Yet drone use has consistently produced the same warping effect on
American experiences in war. Expensive and technologically limited UAVs have been deployed
inefficiently. The covert nature of many drone programs bred distrust, encouraged immoral use,
and shielded those responsible from condemnation. Even worse, these efforts accomplished little
and were typically counter-productive.
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INTRODUCTION:
THE BIRTH OF A DRONE NATION
In 2001 America first fired a Hellfire missile from a Predator drone. The initial test came
in February, before the September 11th terrorist attacks which became the impetus for the
contentious conflicts in which drones have become so common. The Global War on Terror led to
quick military adoption of armed Predators, and their more capable incarnation, the Reaper.
These Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), capable of waging war without endangering
American troops, were used extensively in the official war zones of Iraq and Afghanistan as well
as covertly in Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan. 1 Secret operations have often been controversial;
questions concerning precision, civilian casualties, and international law are frequently raised.
The wide adoption of this seemingly revolutionary technology has had a major impact on
America’s military, foreign policy, and image at home and abroad.
Drones have lodged themselves into American consciousness and society. Drone strike
stories make the twenty-four hour news cycle regularly. They either successfully proclaim the
assassination of a major terrorist leader, or decry the unintended death of civilians.
UAVs inundate American popular culture. Filmmakers include them in their movies,
frequently offering a moral message. The 2013 film Oblivion stars Tom Cruise as a drone
repairman in a dystopian future. The drones are revealed to be evil, killing the innocent remnants

1

Terminology is a tricky subject when dealing with drones. Most military personnel and aeronautical
engineers would use the term drone to reference simplistic target drones which “fly in a persistently dull,
monotonous, and indifferent manner.” These groups are so stringent in their pursuance of correct terminology that
they prefer to use an overwhelming number of acronyms (a practice substantiated by an interview with a military
commander2) sure to confuse casual readers. Various terms are Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), Remotely Piloted
Aircraft (RPA), Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV), and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), but the word “drone” is
unpopular with the military. However, the media, American public, and politicians, have widely adopted “drone.”
This study will use the term “drone” for general understanding, but also “UAV” since it is considered the correct
reference to any unmanned aerial vehicle. Paul Fahlstrom and Thomas Gleason, Introduction to UAV Systems, 4th
ed. Aerospace Series, (Chichester; Wiley, 2012), Accessed February 8, 2013, LSU Libraries, 7; Anonymous Air
Force, Colonel, "UAV Q and A," e-mail interview by author, April 3, 2013.
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of humanity.2 Zero Dark Thirty, which tells the story of “the greatest manhunt in history,” as the
CIA pursues Osama Bin Laden, features drones and more drones.3 Predator drones were even
used to spy on Superman. The man of steel crashes a Predator drone in front of a General’s car,
insisting on his privacy.4 Many more examples exist, many in production.
Television is not immune to this fascination with drones. One of the primary antagonists
in the premiere season of Showtime’s Homeland is fictional Al-Qaeda leader Abu Nazir whose
vengeful pursuits are inflamed after his son is killed in a CIA drone strike.5 Homeland won two
Golden Globes and six Emmys in 2012, including Outstanding Drama Series and Best Television
Series-Drama.6 The second season of HBO’s Newsroom, which retroactively discusses the past
year’s major stories from the perspective of a cable news team, focused attention on President
Obama’s drone policy.7 The primary antagonist of Fox’s 2014 reincarnation of 24 is fictional AlQaeda operative Margot Al-Harazi. After her husband is killed in a drone strike, she plots to
assassinate fictional U.S. President James Heller with stolen drones.8
The recent iterations of the Call of Duty videogames also include drones. As one of the
most successful franchises of all time, selling nearly 140 million copies worldwide, its cultural
prevalence is immense.9 In competitive multiplayer, gamers are given “Killstreak” rewards after
killing enough people on the other team. The “UAV Recon” killstreak reward calls in a

2

Oblivion, dir. Joseph Kosinski, perf. Tom Cruise and Morgan Freeman (New York: Universal Pictures,
2013), film.
3
Zero Dark Thirty, dir. Kathryn Bigelow, perf. Jessica Chastain (Chandigarh, Punjab, India: Columbia
Pictures, 2012), film.
4
Man of Steel, dir. Zack Snyder, perf. Henry Cavill (Lone Pine, California: Warner Bros., 2013), film.
5
Howard Gordon and Alex Gansa, writers, "Homeland," Showtime, 2011.
6
"Homeland-Awards," IMDb, accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1796960
/awards?ref_=tt_awd.
7
Aaron Sorkin, writer, "The Newsroom," HBO, 2013.
8
Robert Cochran and Joel Surnow, writers, "24: Live Another Day," Fox, 2014.
9
"Call of Duty Franchise Game Sales Statistics," Statistic Brain RSS, February 19, 2014, accessed May 15,
2014, http://www.statisticbrain.com/call-of-duty-franchise-game-sales-statistics/.
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reconnaissance UAV, revealing the location of opposing players. The “Predator Missile”
killstreak lets users guide a Hellfire missile fired from a Predator drone. They are among the
most easily acquired and frequently used killstreaks in the game.10
Drones are also venturing into daily life. The ACLU has directed its ire at the Federal
Aviation Administration’s (FAA) regulation changes which enable greater drone use by local
law enforcement. Concerns include privacy protection as well as drones equipped with nonlethal weapons, including rubber bullets and Tasers.11 The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) uses drones for border patrol. Congressional hearings revealed that the Customs and
Border Protection Agency has repeatedly lent drones to local law enforcement, a practice which
Secretary Jeh Johnson supported.12 Drones were reportedly used during the manhunt for copkilling ex-cop Christopher Dorner, though the DHS said this was false. An unarmed Predator
drone was used in 2011 to find the Brossart family, a group of anti-government separatists.13
Drone policy, at home and abroad, has inspired satirical critiques. One of the most
inventive came from fashion designer Adam Harvey who designed a line of anti-drone clothing.
It features a hoodie, scarf, and burqa made of metalized material which impedes thermal imaging
cameras.14 Online retailer Amazon made headlines, and faced ridicule, when it introduced its

10

Call of Duty 4: Modern Warfare (Xbox 360). Developer: Infinity Ward, Publisher: Activision, 2007; Call
of Duty: Modern Warfare 2 (Xbox 360), Developer: Infinity Ward, Publisher: Activision, 2009; Call of
Duty: Modern Warfare 3, (Xbox 360), Developer: Infinity Ward, Publisher: Activision, 2011. The original Call of
Duty 4: Modern Warfare has the “Radar” killstreak which deploys a reconnaissance UAV, Call of Duty: Modern
Warfare 2 and 3 both have the “UAV Recon” and “Predator Missile” killstreaks.
11
"Domestic Drones," American Civil Liberties Union, accessed April 26, 2014,
https://www.aclu.org/blog/ tag/domestic-drones.
12
Stephen Dinan, "Jeh Johnson Wants Homeland Security Drones Focused on Border," Washington Times,
February 26, 2014, accessed May 3, 2014, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/feb/26/jeh-johnson-wantshomeland-security-drones-focused/.
13
"Dorner: A Drone Target on U.S. Soil," Salon, February 11, 2013, accessed May 1, 2014,
http://www.salon.com/2013/02/11/dorner_a_drone_target_on_u_s_soil/.
14
Amanda Kooser, "Anti-drone Hoodie and Burqa Hide You from Surveillance," CNET, April 4, 2013,
accessed April 27, 2014, http://www.cnet.com/news/anti-drone-hoodie-and-burqa-hide-you-from-surveillance/.
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Prime Air delivery service, making use of drones to deliver packages. There was justifiable
skepticism. The FAA is waiting until 2020 to begin certifying commercial drones. Amazon’s
announcement also came the Sunday before Cyber Monday, thus gaining attention right before
the largest online shopping day of the year.15
Average citizens also use drones. A large hobbyist community enjoys building and
tinkering with them. Drones are making farming easier. Farmers use camera equipped-UAVs to
conduct autonomous crop monitoring. This makes monitoring large swaths of land much easier,
and aids in determining fertilizer and pesticide use. The FAA is concerned and still drafting the
regulations for agricultural drones. Near-collisions with passenger jets have occurred.16
Drones have clearly entered American consciousness and society. Little attention,
however, has been paid to how America got here, how it became a drone nation. This thesis
seeks to counter the “New Drone” misconception, the general ignorance of drone history present
in the historiography, and popular perception of the subject. Actually, there has been nearly a
century of American drone development.
Chapter one, “The “New Drone” Misconception: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in the
World Wars,” examines America’s first experiments with military drones. Charles Kettering,
Henry Harley “Hap” Arnold, and Reginald Denny were among the first to recognize UAV
potential and garner American support. Arguably the main motivation for drone use--removing
American soldiers from danger--was first recognized during this period. These overlooked early

15

Nicholas Carlson, "The Real Reason Amazon Announced Delivery Drones Last Night: $3 Million In
Free Advertising On Cyber Monday," Business Insider, December 02, 2013, accessed May 5, 2014,
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-amazon-announced-delivery-drones-2013-12.
16
Steve Henn, "High-Ho, The Derry-O, The Farmer And The Drone," NPR, May 10, 2014, accessed May
20, 2014, http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2014/05/10/311143655/high-ho-the-derry-o-the-farmer-andthe-drone.
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drones suggest that contemporary parallels, such as imprecision and civilian casualties, are not
new.
Chapter two, “The ‘Inevitability’ of Drones and the Cold War” questions the assumption
that drone adoption was inevitable. Such perceived inevitability creates a futuristic image, with
connotations of superiority leading to blanket acceptance. Examining drone development during
the Cold War Era reveals a very different reality. Drones faced major obstacles, including
technical limitations, expense, and competition from other emerging technologies. It took until
the 1990s for drones to truly prove themselves.
Just as drone technology is not new, neither are the facile policies which guide its use.
Chapter three, “American Counterinsurgency: The Phoenix Program in Vietnam and
Contemporary Drone Policy,” is a comparative analysis of American counterinsurgency efforts.
The integration of drone strikes into counterinsurgency efforts, especially in unofficial war zones
such as Pakistan, has led to popular interest and concern. Many of the same problems
(inefficiency, civilian casualties, corruption, and public outrage) that have plagued drone use also
haunted America’s efforts with the Phoenix program.
Because of the potential drones hold today, careful consideration of their problematic
history is essential. Protecting Americans from war by replacing soldiers with drones has been a
century long effort. Yet drone usage has consistently produced the same warping effect on
American experiences in war. Expensive and technologically limited UAVs have been deployed
inefficiently. The covert nature of many drone programs bred distrust, encouraged immoral use,
and shielded those responsible from condemnation. Even worse, these efforts accomplished little
and were typically counter-productive.
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CHAPTER ONE:
THE “NEW DRONE” MISCONCEPTION: UNMANNED AERIAL
VEHICLES IN THE WORLD WARS
Popular perception of America’s drones sees them as a new technology, a seemingly
futuristic revolution of warfare which allows unmanned aircraft to perform important military
tasks without a pilot physically present in the vehicle. In reality, this belief is a misconception.
Few realize how long Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have been a part of the American
military. First receiving military backing in World War I and continuing throughout the 20th
century, drones have long been used for combat, training, and reconnaissance tasks by the
American military. This history of drone use can provide perspective for modern drone policy.
Recent expansion of drone use has received a great deal of attention from citizens, media, and
politicians. Their primary utilization in the Middle East for surveillance and assassination has
created concerns over international law and civilian casualties. There is a price to be paid: the
more drones are used for questionable military actions, the worse their public perception
becomes. This chapter examines early UAVs to refute the “new drone” misconception,
demonstrate that drones have accomplished more than their latest uses, and show how issues
concerning drone policy were dealt with in the past.
America’s use of drones greatly expanded during the War on Terror. Drones are valuable
military technology, recognized for their combat and surveillance uses. News sources frequently
portray drones as the wave of the future in military aeronautics, forgetting significant earlier uses
of drones.
This misconception of UAVs as new has been perpetrated by respected media outlets
such as The Washington Post, The Economist, and The New York Times. A documentary for the
Public Broadcasting Service’s (PBS) Nova series, “Rise of the Drones” claims to expose viewers
6

to “a new chapter of aviation history.”17 In this pursuit of the new, the documentary ignores
decades of early drone use as too costly and technologically limited for meaningful examination.
Not only does “Rise of the Drones” ignore history, but it does not note that modern drones have
these same problems. Similarly, a New York Times article entitled “A History of Drone Warfare”
only goes back to 2001 with the initial weapons testing of the Predator drone.18
The media give aeronautical engineer Abe Karem and the Defense Advanced Research
Project Agency (DARPA) the credit for America’s drones. Karem, whose drone prototype
Amber was the basis of the modern Predator drone, and DARPA, which developed many of the
technologies used by modern drones, have certainly made important contributions, but
presenting only their recent accomplishments is misleading. The Economist calls Karem “The
dronefather,” giving him sole credit for creating “the robotic plane that transformed the way
modern warfare is waged.”19 Similarly, the Washington Post’s treatment of the history of UAVs
focuses only on Karem’s contributions.20
Past scholarship on early drones is frequently incomplete. Most accounts begin with
those built by Ryan Aeronautical Company for use in the Cold War. Thomas P. Ehrhard’s Air
Force UAVs: The Secret History gives a short history of America’s drones, but does not consider
pre-Vietnam drones worthy of coverage. Kenneth P. Werrell’s, The Evolution of the Cruise
Missile, discusses precursors, but as the title of his 1985 book suggests, in relation to cruise
missiles, not UAVs. Aeronautic enthusiasts are devout compilers of data but offer little more

17

Rise of the Drones, Directed by Peter Yost, (2013), Television Broadcast, Accessed February 24, 2013,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/military/rise-of-the-drones.html.
18
"A History of Drone Warfare," New York Times (New York), May 24, 2013, A8 sec.
19
"Brain Scan: The Dronefather," Economist.com, (December 1, 2012), Accessed January 30, 2013.
20
Peter Finn, "Rise of the Drone: From Calif. Garage to Multibillion-dollar Defense Industry," Washington
Post, (December 23, 2011), Accessed January 31, 2013.
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than factual information. America has been using drones for most of the 20th century, something
largely ignored by these sources.
Though Abe Karem has been deemed the “dronefather” by the media, other people such
as Charles Kettering, Reginald Denny, and especially Henry Harley “Hap” Arnold were
instrumental in developing UAVs. Hap Arnold’s contributions to early UAVs are briefly
mentioned in biographies but are overshadowed by his numerous other accomplishments.
Frequently called a pioneer21, Arnold was one of America’s first military pilots. He learned to fly
directly from the Wright brothers and received the second-ever pilot’s license issued by the
military.22 As a pilot he was a two-time winner of the Mackey trophy, awarded for “the most
meritorious flight of the year.”23 By 1938 he had become the commanding officer of the United
States Army Air Corps (USAAC), a position he held throughout World War II, as the Air Force
became a separate service arm, the United States Army Air Force (USAAF). Arnold expanded
America’s pitiful air power of “2,000 airplanes and 21,000 personnel” to the largest aeronautical
war machine the world had ever seen with “79,000 airplanes and 2,300,000 personnel.”24 Arnold
should also be recognized for his support of early drones which paved the way for later
innovations and aided the development of today’s drones.

21

"Hap Arnold Lecture Series, Air War College, Air University," Hap Arnold Lecture Series, Air War
College, Air University, accessed February 19, 2013, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/outreach-program/index.htm;
Flint O. DuPre, "Biographies : General Henry H. Arnold," The Official Website of the U.S. Air Force, accessed
February 19, 2013, http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio.asp?bioID=4551.
22
Thomas M. Coffey, HAP: The Story of the U.S. Air Force and the Man Who Built It, General Henry H.
"Hap" Arnold (New York: Viking Press, 1982), 48-53.
23
"Trophies and Awards at the National Air and Space Museum," Smithsonian: National Air and Space
Museum, accessed April 23, 2013, http://airandspace.si.edu/research/aero/trophy/mackay.cfm.
24
Gen. Henry H. Arnold, National Museum of the US Air Force, Accessed March 1, 2013,
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=8526.
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The Kettering Bug
The first UAV to receive military support was developed during World War I. The
official name for this early drone was “Liberty Eagle,” but it is more commonly referred to as the
Kettering “Bug” to honor its inventor, Charles F. Kettering, who had been assigned to evaluate
the possibility of developing an aerial torpedo. Kettering, eventually a major figure at General
Motors, had already established himself as an outstanding engineer. He invented the Electric
Self-Starter which helped Cadillac win the Dewar Trophy in 1913, the highest automotive prize
at the time.25 He witnessed the successful flight of a small pilotless plane guided by a simple
auto-pilot system. Kettering insisted that this proof of concept flight demonstrated the
plausibility of aerial torpedoes, and he personally directed the Bug’s expansion.26

Fig. 1 Charles Kettering27

Fig 2. The Kettering “Bug”28

As seen in Fig. 2, the Kettering “Bug” was launched with a four-wheeled dolly and
portable track. The Bug had an internal system of “pre-set pneumatic and electrical controls”
which acted like modern auto-pilot systems, stabilizing and guiding the drone to its target. The

25

"Kettering, Charles F.," Generations of GM RSS, accessed February 27, 2014, http://history.
gmheritagecenter.com/wiki/index.php/Kettering%2C_Charles_F.
26
Andreas Parsch, "Dayton Wright/Kettering Liberty Eagle "Bug," (May 12, 2005), Accessed April 01,
2013, http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/app4/bug.html.
27
Charles F. Kettering, Engineers Club of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio, accessed January 30, 2014,
http://www.daytoninnovationlegacy.org/kettering.html.
28
“KETTERING AERIAL TORPEDO “BUG,”” National Museum of The US Air Force, March 21, 2007,
Accessed February 11, 2013. http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=320.
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amount of flight time needed to reach a target was programmed into the Bug, and once it had
flown for that amount of time, presumably reaching its target, the engine shut off. After
deactivation, the wings released, plunging the drone and the explosives it carried to the ground
where it detonated on impact.29
Built to be a self-sacrificing weapon, the Kettering Bug was constructed of cheap
materials. The body was made of papier-mâché, its wings made of cardboard. Despite its
disposable nature, the Bug’s 40-horsepower engine allowed it to carry up to 300 pounds of
explosives and reach a speed of 50 mph.30
Though the Kettering Bug bears Charles Kettering’s name, Hap Arnold was also
instrumental in its development. Despite frequent requests for a combat position during the war,
he was kept in Washington, D.C. During World War I, Arnold was the second-highest ranking
officer in the War Department’s Air Division, and for a majority of the war, the highest ranking
pilot in Washington. He had become a Colonel by August 1917, the youngest in the Army at the
time.31 His relatively-rare expertise was likely the reason for his appointment to multiple aviation
boards such as the Joint Army and Navy Technical Board, for which he was to “investigate new
types of air-craft and accessories and to make recommendations covering types that would be
placed into production by the Army and Navy.”32 He saw the potential that an unmanned-plane

29

Ibid.
Splendid Vision, Unswerving Purpose: Developing Air Power for the United States Air Force during the
First Century of Powered Flight (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: History Office, Aeronautical Systems
Center, Air Force Materiel Command, 2002), 22.
30

31

Henry Harley Arnold, Global Mission. (New York, NY: Harper, 1949), 48.
Henry H. Arnold, World War I Duties, Journal, From Library of Congress, The Henry Harley Arnold
Papers, 1903-1989, Microfilm, reel 3.
32
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bomb would have for World War I’s trench warfare, and used his position in the War
Department to support the Kettering Bug.33
Driven by a passion to advance aeronautical technology, Arnold also pushed military
leaders to support the Bug.34 Arnold invited military leaders to witness a test flight of the Bug at
the Dayton air field. However, the Bug malfunctioned, sputtered in the air, and fell dangerously
close to those who had assembled. No one was seriously injured; a second test flight went as
planned.35
The Bug never saw combat. Its successful October 2, 1918, flight test took place just a
month before the Armistice with Germany.36 According to Arnold, “it was planned to launch
thousands every day against German strong points, concentration areas, munitions plants, etc.”37
Reports of the Bug’s flight tests boast of its range and accuracy. Despite this optimism, there
were concerns over the Bug’s reliability, particularly if it flew over Allied troops.38 It is unclear
what the origins of concern were, though a failed test before military leaders in Dayton surely
did not help. The Bug’s cheap components and the revolutionary nature of the project itself may
have also worried military leaders.
Since the Bug was never used in combat, it has largely been ignored. Fewer than fifty
were built before the Armistice. Even though the Kettering Bug did not actively contribute to
the war effort, it was still significant. It reveals the American military’s desire for a relatively
accurate way of bombing targets from the air without risking the lives of pilots. It was the first
33

Arnold, Global Mission, 74-75.
DeWitt S. Copp, A Few Great Captains: The Men and Events That Shaped the Development of U.S. Air
Power (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), 118.
35
Ibid, 23.
36
Splendid Vision, Unswerving Purpose, 22.
37
Arnold, Global Mission, 76.
38
Splendid Vision, Unswerving Purpose, 22.
34
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instance in which UAVs, as opposed to piloted aircrafts, received military backing and financial
support.39 Experience gained with the Kettering Bug would also be important in coming years,
once remote-controlled UAVs were developed.
Experiments with the Kettering Bug continued into the 1920s but ended because of a lack
of funding. After World War I, Kettering returned to developing cars rather than planes.
However, when America entered World War II, Kettering wanted to give his Bug another go.
Kettering Bug Part II
Throughout 1942, Charles Kettering struggled to get the USAAF to support the Kettering
Bug. His motivation is unclear. Perhaps he wanted to have his invention receive the combat
experience denied earlier. His communications with the USAAF suggest he had high-hopes for
the Bug and believed it capable of being an effective weapon against the Germans. However, all
of his supposed optimism should be tempered by the fact that he had become General Motors’
head of research; production of the bug would mean the purchase of General Motors products.
Another reason to discount Kettering’s confidence was the numerous problems with the project.
Over twenty years had passed between the WWI Bug and the new attempt during WWII.
The time lapse meant new technology would be used. The initial Bug’s 40-horsepower engine
was replaced by a new “8-cylinder 2-cycle 200 horsepower liquid cooled engine.”40 The
improved capabilities increased the Bug’s speed from 50mph to 200mph, and it could now carry
500, rather than 300, pounds of explosives.41
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Despite these improvements, plans for the Bug’s implementation still relied on outdated
targeting technology. The new prototypes were still using the World War I era targeting system.
This meant the drone would fly a preset distance and then plunge to the ground and explode.
Army-Air Force analysis showed this to be wildly inaccurate. If the weather were properly
forecast, and the Bug only had to travel 50 miles, then it could strike within a half mile of the
target. However, Army-Air Force projections said that in uncertain weather conditions, or when
traveling longer distances, the Bug could end up landing up to 20 miles away from the target. 42
Even at short distances, the Bug’s preset data targeting was too inaccurate to fit into
America’s strategic bombing campaign in 1942. An April 16, 1942 USAAF analysis prepared at
Commanding General Hap Arnold’s request43 rejects the idea of using Bugs to indiscriminately
bomb the enemy, fearing it would increase their resistance. Arnold underlined the section of the
report suggesting no Bugs be produced using the preset data targeting, further damning the
program. However, Arnold was optimistic that the Bug could be implemented if the accuracy of
its targeting improved.44
Ambitious new technologies were considered to improve the Bug’s accuracy. Homing
devices were under development. So were controls which used heat, light, sound, and radar
transmissions. However, in mid-1942 when the Bug was being evaluated, these new targeting
technologies were unfinished. Instead, it was decided that the Bugs, if implemented, would need
to be radio controlled to be accurate. The Navy hoped to improve the Bug’s accuracy by

42

Ibid, 2-3.
Gen. Arnold, Mr. Kettering's "Flying Bug", Report Request from Gen, Arnold to Gen. Harmon, April 7,
1942, From Library of Congress, The Henry Harley Arnold Papers, 1903-1989, Microfilm, reel 128, 1.
44
Mr. Kettering's "Flying Bug", 3.
43

13

installing television cameras to improve guidance. Arnold seemed favorable to radio controlled
Bugs, adding a hand-written note that accuracy would be “very much” improved.45
There were other problems with the Kettering Bug. Special facilities and squadrons
would need to be created for the Bug operators. Operators needed training to hone the skills
required to operate the Bugs accurately. Control airplanes would be needed to carry operators as
they remotely piloted the Bugs. The Bugs would require storage space, and their design was
more cumbersome than the traditional ordinance it was essentially replicating. Ultimately, the
fact that the Bug only carried 500 pounds of explosives with a limited range of 400 miles led the
Army-Air Force to label it “inadequate.”46
Kettering did not give up. In response to the critique of the Bug’s size and limited
capabilities, Kettering devised a “Double Bug.” The Double Bug would be able to travel 1,000
miles and carry 2,000 pounds of explosives. However, even these capabilities were considered to
be the bare minimum in order to “warrant the trouble and expense.”47
Still undeterred, Kettering appealed directly to military brass. Beginning his letter with
“My dear Colonel,” Kettering promoted the Bug to Colonel Grandison Gardner, at the Air Force
Proving Ground Command, Eglin Field, Florida. Kettering pointed out that the Bugs General
Motors had produced fit the specifications requested by the Air Corps, specifications which had
previously been “thought to be sufficient.” Kettering termed the Bug an efficient weapon, saying
it “uses no strategic material and consists of only the essential parts necessary to fly.” However,
the Bug was supposed to crash into its target and explode, meaning the sacrifice of a small plane,
a TV camera, equipment for radio control, and a sophisticated new engine. Indeed, it was this
45
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engine Kettering cared about the most. Kettering argued that “The only reason we were willing
to undertake this job” was the utilization of the sophisticated motor General Motors had created.
Its development had cost over 1,000 man hours and, without specifics, he claimed it had
“characteristics never before obtained.” Hoping an old acquaintance would be more receptive,
Kettering asked Gardner to forward his pro-Bug letter to General Arnold.48
Gardner sent a harsh report about the Bug along with the forwarded letter. Gardner told
Arnold that five experimental Bugs had been tested, though he only mentions the most recent as
having “performed very well.” Gardner pointed out that takeoff was still an issue for the Bugs.49
They were launching them with a catapult.50 The proposed use of television cameras to improve
accuracy had not yet been proven effective. The Bug had not demonstrated that it could hit its
target. Gardner seemed annoyed with Kettering, saying “Although those connected with the
development of this weapon are highly optimistic as to the results they expect to obtain, it is felt
that any decision to put it in production should be withheld pending the demonstration of its
practicability.”51
With General Motors behind the Bug, large-scale production was not an issue. However,
the numerous problems raised during the testing process seem to have ended the efforts to use
the Bug. Arnold conducted a meeting with Kettering and William Knudsen, also from General
Motors, to discuss the Bug’s strategic merit. The three men discussed several issues raised
including “the availability of bases; of targets; the cost; production; comparison of production
between the Bugs and heavy bombers; raw materials needed for the two types of weapons.” The
48
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three agreed to terminate the project because even with several technological improvements, the
Bug’s short range only allowed it to hit occupied cities in France, Belgium, and Holland; not the
desired target of interior Germany.52 Despite the efforts of Charles Kettering, Hap Arnold, and
others within the Air Corps, the Bug had failed to be combat-ready in both World Wars.
Although the Kettering Bug failed, the experience gained influenced the development of the first
military drone to actually be deployed in combat.
Operation Aphrodite
In late 1943, about a year and a half after the experiments with the updated Kettering
Bug, General Arnold ordered Grandison Gardner, now a Brigadier General, to conduct a new
UAV project.53 Officially named Operation Aphrodite, the project produced the most significant
UAVs yet developed. Overseen by Hap Arnold, the new drones had elements of the Kettering
Bug and newer drones. Arnold’s support of Operation Aphrodite stemmed from his continued
fascination with developing new technologies for warfare. 54 Though both attempts with the
Kettering Bug had failed, his autobiography reveals he desperately wanted to develop combat
drones.55 Arnold and Gardner’s link to the Kettering Bug is significant because the new drones
borrowed heavily from earlier drone projects.
During World War II, the USAAF repeatedly attempted to conserve aircraft resources. A
major focus was placed on conserving aircraft through repairs before they would finally be
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designated “War Weary,” removed from tactical deployment, and replaced by functioning
aircraft. Operation Aphrodite took the USAAF’s conservation efforts one step further.56
The idea behind Operation Aphrodite was to use surplus, war-weary B-17 and B-24
planes, remove their weapons, armor, and interiors, and pack the planes with explosives. The use
of these war-weary planes led to the explosive drones being nicknamed “Weary Willies.”57 This
rather unprepossessing nickname was a reference to the popular tragic clown, Weary Willy,
played by Emmett Kelly in the Ringling Brothers Circus.58 Weary Willies functioned similarly to
Japanese Kamikaze planes, crashing into their targets and exploding. However, Weary Willies
did not require the sacrifice of human pilots. Weary Willies were not completely unmanned,
requiring pilots to take off. However, the pilots then bailed out, and the planes could be remotely
controlled into their targets.59 During operations, Weary Willies were not controlled from the
ground but from a plane that followed.60
It is unsurprising that Aphrodite’s Weary Willies borrowed heavily from the Kettering
Bug. Operationally speaking, the two drones were nearly identical; both were explosive-stuffed
planes guided by radio control to their targets. However, Aphrodite avoided many of the
problems which plagued the Kettering Bug. Aphrodite’s use of elderly planes meant new planes
were unnecessary. Aircraft storage space would be created. Aphrodite’s recycled planes had
56
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sufficient operational range. Unlike the Bug, the 14,00061-18,50062 pounds of explosives Weary
Willies could carry was satisfactory.

Fig 3. Henry “Hap” Arnold63

Fig. 4 A Weary Willie drone taking off. 64

Fig. 5 Joseph P. Kennedy Jr.65

Initially, the goal of Operation Aphrodite was to destroy German V-1 missile sites.
Traditional American bombers had had little luck destroying these heavily-protected locations,
considered “practically invulnerable to normal bombing attacks.” The hope was that unmanned,
bomb-stuffed planes would be able to crash into the missile sites, and destroy them without
risking the lives of pilots.66
The Weary Willies did not live up to these high hopes. In combat, Weary Willies did not
fare any better than piloted aircraft against the German defenses. The fact that Weary Willies
were recycled, deteriorating aircraft that had been stripped of their armor contributed to their
lack of success. Limited maneuverability through remote control lessened the chances for Weary
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Willies to succeed. German anti-aircraft gunners were able to shoot down the drones before they
reached their target destinations.67
Weary Willies also suffered from safety issues, one of which altered the course of
American political history. By 1944 the U.S. Navy had developed an offshoot of Operation
Aphrodite, Operation Anvil. The Navy felt that attaching television cameras and monitors to the
Weary Willies would improve the aim of the operators using remote controls.68 The pilot in the
Navy’s first use of Aphrodite drones was Joseph P. Kennedy Jr., the older brother of John F.
Kennedy. Kennedy’s role as a Weary Willie pilot has falsely been described as a “suicide
mission.”69 While piloting an explosive-packed plane specifically designed to blow up was
certainly risky, Kennedy was only supposed to get the plane off the ground and then bail out,
once operators using remote controls in the accompanying mother plane had taken over. An
unknown technical problem, perhaps related to malfunctioning circuitry, caused the premature
detonation of the explosives in Kennedy’s plane, killing him and his co-pilot Wilford Willy.70
This deadly mishap would have caused second thoughts about Operation Aphrodite no matter
who the pilot was. Because it was Joseph Kennedy Jr., fear of his politically-connected father’s
reaction “caused much consternation at many military headquarters.”71
The final problem with Operation Aphrodite was that Weary Willies contradicted
America’s strategic bombing doctrine, to use precision bombing against military and industrial
sites, and attempt to avoid civilian casualties. As the Weary Willies were used, it became
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apparent that they “would fall on the Germans indiscriminately.”72 In October 1944, the United
States Strategic Air Forces decided to use Weary Willies against German cities. 73 Arnold was
very supportive of this idea.
Something had clearly shifted in Arnold’s thinking. A report evaluating the Kettering
Bug in 1942 attacked the idea of using it for indiscriminate bombing. The report states “there is
considerable evidence to show that its (indiscriminate area bombing) results may be harmful
from the stiffened moral resistance of the victims.” Arnold even underlined the section of the
report which said none of these inaccurate Kettering Bugs should be produced.74 However, by
November 1944, Arnold’s interactions with Aphrodite suggest he was no longer concerned with
the death of enemy civilians.
Allied losses by late 1944 were a major factor for Arnold’s support of Aphrodite,
something which was lacking when he dismissed the Kettering Bug. On November 23, 1944,
Arnold wrote a letter to Lieutenant General Carl “Tooey” Spaatz, outlining his ideas for Weary
Willy use. Though Weary Willies were primarily used against military targets, such as the V-1
missile sites, Arnold wanted to use them “as an irritant and possibly a means of breaking down
the morale of the people of interior Germany.” He approved of Britain’s nighttime area
bombings and wanted to emulate their actions. He specifically designated Cologne as a target,
suggesting they simply launch the plane, have the pilot bail out, and let it fall anywhere within
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the city limits. Arnold told Spaatz that he was ready to organize the logistics: pilots, crews,
experts, and planes in order to carry out this assault on the German populace.75
Arnold seems bitter and vengeful for the terror Germany wreaked on Britain during The
Blitz. Arnold wrote “My idea would be to turn them loose to land all over Germany so that the
Germans would be just as much afraid of our war weary planes on account of not knowing just
where they were going to hit, as are the people in England from the buzz bombs and rockets.”
Arnold said the unmanned-planes should simply be launched towards a German city. As the warweary planes were shot down, and aircraft debris rained on the city, the indiscriminate danger
meant “the psychological effect on the morale of the German people would be much greater.”
The strategic justification for this random assault was that the Germans would have to be
constantly prepared. The ever-present need to shoot down incoming planes meant the Germans
would have to commit fighter pilots and functioning aircrafts for defense. America would only
sacrifice decrepit planes. Even if Arnold’s plan would tie up German resources, it is
disconcerting that he would consider a strategy essentially identical to that of the Nazis as
acceptable. He does not voice any concern for German civilians in the letter.76
On January 1, 1945, one of the drones crashed into a residential area.77 Operation
Aphrodite was ended around a month later, after the Yalta Conference. Officials recognized that
the program contradicted the official, often ignored, American strategy of attempting to avoid
civilian casualties. The British also feared that Aphrodite would prompt the Germans to expand
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their terror bombing.78 Lt. General James Doolittle dismissed the operation, saying “this whole
project is put together with baling wire, chicken guts, and ignorance.”79
Hap Arnold’s evaluation of Operation Aphrodite was more favorable. Arnold’s first
justification of the program combined economy and efficiency. Arnold saw that recycling the B17 and B-24 planes would make space in crowded American Air fields. Reusing and destroying
old planes would also guarantee that new and improved planes would be manufactured. Arnold
insisted that non-precision bombing was acceptable as long as it caused damage to the enemy.80
As late as February 6 1945, two days into Yalta, Arnold was still actively supporting Aphrodite.
He sent orders to Gardner that equipment should be developed that would make Weary Willies
completely unmanned by eliminating the need for the pilots who got the planes airborne before
bailing out.81
Perhaps the most significant contribution Arnold made to the development of drones was
the argument he made in support of Operation Aphrodite. Arnold asserted that one should “try
and kill as many men and destroy as much property as you can. If you can get mechanical
machines to do this, then you are saving lives at the outset.”82 Even today, performing combat
missions without risking the lives of American servicemen remains one of the strongest
justifications for the use of drones.
This is the obvious explanation for Arnold’s persistent commitment to Operation
Aphrodite. Arnold wanted to spare as many Americans as he could from the horrors of war. In
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1943 Arnold spent December in Italy. Despite his long military career, Arnold seems shaken by
the things he witnessed. His journal entry for December 11, 1943, is filled with disturbing
imagery. Entitled “Modern battle,” he describes war-ravaged Naples. Arnold first emphasizes the
mechanized nature of the war: “Modern battle – jeeps and mud, trucks and tanks, more mud,
trucks and road jams… Villages and towns demolished, partly demolished. Destruction and
devastation everywhere.” He then turns to the devastation this mechanization wreaks on man:
Hospitals, field and evacuation, ambulances, operating room, removing bomb and shell
splinters from the soldier’s head, pulling a mangled hand together, tying a body together
after a shell fragment tore loose a hip and almost all of a buttock, wounds in the
abdomen, holes in back and abdomen the size of a football, blood transfusions. . . Nurses
doing their part, working overtime, smiling. . . A man with only half his innards dying,
but still smiling and saying, “I’m all right.”83
Arnold had been spared from combat. He attended West Point, served briefly in the
Philippines, and then became one of America’s first military pilots. His aeronautical expertise
obliged him to spend WWI in Washington where his service was considered more valuable than
in battle. 84 It is unlikely that his experience in Italy was the first time he witnessed the carnage
caused by war, but considering his visceral experience, his enthusiasm for using drones rather
than risking lives is understandable.
Operation Aphrodite and Weary Willies had little impact on the outcome of World War
II. Despite this, it was still the first instance in which America deployed drones for combat
purposes. Though Aphrodite failed, it elicited a philosophy of war from Hap Arnold similar to
collateral damage, the questionable military doctrine employed for drone use in modern times.
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The Radioplane
Also during World War II, Reginald Denny, a British immigrant, made another important
contribution to America’s development of drones. Denny had two passions, acting and
aeronautics. In a career spanning from 1915-1966 he had 186 acting roles, and it was his pursuit
of Hollywood success which brought him to America.85 However, Denny had served as a British
pilot during World War I and he also found success in American aeronautics. Though he was
not a major player, Denny fed his aeronautical interests and capitalized on his fame by opening
“Reginald Denny’s Hobby Shop” to sell radio-controlled airplanes. 86
His hobby shop continued to function as a retailer for RC airplane enthusiasts, but by
1935 Denny’s business had expanded to include the “Radioplane” company. 87 Denny realized
that his cheap RC planes could be used for target practice in training anti-aircraft gunners. In
1935 he successfully demonstrated his RP-1(Radioplane) prototype to the U.S. Army. Within
four years he had produced four iterations of the Radioplane for military use. 88 Though some
Radioplanes were purchased by the U.S. Army in the late ‘30s; America’s entrance into World
War II led to large orders, nearly 1,000 in 1943, from both the Army and Navy. Demand was so
high that throughout the war other manufacturers were used to produce thousands of Denny’s
Radioplanes.89 With his Radioplane, Denny had created the first UAV to be widely adopted by
the American military.
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Fig. 6 Denny’s Hobby Shop in 196190

Fig. 7 Denny in his workroom, 91

Fig. 8 The Radioplane92

Launched from a catapult, the Radioplane was remotely controlled from the ground. If
not destroyed during target practice it could deploy a parachute and be recovered. 93 The
Radioplane had a simple two-cylinder, two-cycle engine with six horsepower. Despite its weak
engine, its top speed was 85 miles per hour because the Radioplane was small and light.94
Denny’s UAVS were target drones, rather than combat drones, such as the Kettering Bug
or Weary Willies. Numerous different target drones would be produced throughout the 20th
century and continue to be used today. Eventually, Denny’s Radioplane Company was obsolete,
thanks to more complex target drones produced by other manufacturers. In 1952 the defense
technology company Northrop purchased the rights to the Radioplane.95 Though he was no
longer involved with the Radioplane, Denny’s early target drone led to important advances in
UAV technology during the Cold War.
During the World Wars, drones produced few tangible results on the battlefield.
However, Arnold’s extensive experience with drones and other new war technologies (long90
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range bombers and atomic bombs) had a significant impact on his thinking, contributing to his
advocacy for a more intelligent and modern approach to warfare. Arnold would retire soon after
the end of World War II, but he had dedicated his career to advancing the future of aviation.
During both World Wars he helped push aeronautical innovation through UAV development.
These experiences convinced him that drones would play a major role in American military
aviation. In his V-J (Victory over Japan) day speech, Arnold sought to convince his fellow
servicemen as well. Congratulating his listeners on their victory, Arnold said “We have just won
a war with a lot of heroes flying around in planes.” He then turned to the future and, likely
reflecting on his experiences with UAVs, said “The next war may be fought with airplanes with
no men in them at all. It certainly will be fought with planes so far superior to those we have now
that there will be no basis for comparison.” Arnold recognized the potential that drones would
have for the future of warfare and took steps to help later drones to succeed.96
A significant and long-lasting contribution came in December 1945 when Arnold
successfully lobbied the War Department and Congress to create Project RAND (Research and
Development), an experimental “one year study on the future of warfare.” Arnold explained to
the War Department that it was necessary to bring in civilian scientists and researchers to help
drive technological innovation for the military. He complained that previously there had not been
enough collaboration toward innovation among the different branches of the military,
governmental agencies, and industry. In his appeal for Project RAND, Arnold argued that
“scientific planning must be years in advance of the actual research and development work." 97
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Arnold also advocated for the future of drones in his official War Reports. Published
along with those of Army General George C. Marshall and Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King,
Arnold’s contributions reflect a sense of hesitant optimism. The Army and Navy were long
established branches of the military; the Air Force was not. Though air power had performed
well during World War II, when the War Reports came out in 1947 it was still the subservient
“Army Air Force.” Within the year the Air Force would separate from the Army, but Arnold had
spent his life serving a subservient military branch. He cautions against allowing America’s
military might to deteriorate, and echoing his experience with Project RAND, insists on the
necessity for greater scientific research and development to produce more advanced aircraft.
Notably, advanced pilotless planes are listed first in his “New Concepts” to be developed.98
Project RAND was renewed until 1948 when it became the independent RAND
Corporation, to this day one of the most important military think tanks. Drones helped convince
Arnold of the necessity of RAND; RAND helped convince the military of the potential of drones
in years to come.99
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CHAPTER TWO:
THE “INEVITABILITY” OF DRONES AND THE COLD WAR
The Cold War, along with the 1990s, was the most significant period for drone
development. Driven by covert surveillance needs, there were numerous attempts to produce a
viable drone, but with little success. The failures are often ignored by enthusiasts. Technological
determinism--the unquestioning belief in the ability of new technologies to solve society’s
problems--has taken hold today. This can be seen in the misconception of the inevitability of
drone adoption. Earlier unsuccessful models are overlooked, focusing on the birth of the
successful Predator. The relative ignorance of this drone history creates a specious air of
inevitability. New technologies are rarely questioned, especially if their record seems successful.
In reality, during the Cold War, drones faced numerous obstacles, including technological
limitations, expense, and competition from manned aerial surveillance (the U-2) and satellites. In
addition, when the potential of UAVs finally emerged in the 1990s, the threat of foreign drones
was quickly integrated into American military analysis.
The military currently sees increased drone use as the inevitable future of aerial warfare.
In 2013, the air force predicted that, within a decade, a third of all its attack planes would be
unmanned. More drone pilots are being trained than fighter and bomber pilots combined.100
Drones have surpassed manned planes in flight hours.101 Drones are being promoted so heavily
that it is difficult to find enough pilots, though some problems are tied to poor promotion rates or
negative comparisons to conventional pilots.102 Military think tanks, such as the International
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Institute for Strategic Studies, fully support this drone expansion, recognizing that drones have
proven themselves and are becoming cheaper.103 Increased integration of drones seems likely
now and for the twenty-first century.
Why Drones?
The surveillance needs of the Cold War were the primary motivation for drone
development. In 1954 President Eisenhower first authorized reconnaissance missions using the
U-2 spy plane. The plane was revolutionary at the time, capable of flying at 70,000 feet and up to
4,000 miles without refueling. The altitude was initially too high for Soviet anti-air defenses.
Eisenhower limited his use of the U-2 during most of his administration, but in early 1960,
seeking information on Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) development, he
authorized more missions in Soviet airspace. This resulted in the 1960 Gary Francis Powers U-2
incident, in which the pilot was shot down. The Soviet Union recovered incriminating evidence:
Powers alive, remnants of the plane, and the film. International scandal erupted after American
denials of guilt and Soviet revelations, ruining a summit in Paris between the United States,
Soviet Union, Britain, and France, as well as intensifying Cold War tensions.104 Avoiding these
dangers, both political and to pilots, was a major factor in greater American drone development.
The dangers of aerial surveillance were frequently revealed. During the Cuban Missile
Crisis, two years after the Powers incident, Maj. Rudolph Anderson Jr.’s U-2 was shot down. No
longer able to hide at 70,000 feet, U-2s faced a serious threat from anti-air defenses. Air Force
leaders considered but rejected reconnaissance drone prototypes. Officials did not want to risk
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revealing this new technological development to the Soviet Union.105 Discussions in 1965
between Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance
led to a memo which recognized that “The use of U-2’s over Communist China is becoming
increasingly hazardous because of SAMS and MIG 21 attack techniques.” McNamara and Vance
would have preferred using drones to U-2s, but could not because of technical difficulties.106 On
April 18, 1968, a manned surveillance plane was shot down over North Korea, killing thirty-one
Americans. President Nixon was criticized for sending airmen into such a hostile situation;
drones were considered the answer.107
The drone solutions contemplated in Cuba, and implemented in Korea, were actually
modified target drones, Reginald Denny’s original concept. Operating out of San Diego
California, Ryan Aeronautical manufactured target drones for weapons testing and training. 108
By 1962, the company had turned its Fire Bee target drone into the Fire Fly reconnaissance
drone. Over time, Ryan Aeronautical would produce more than twenty variations of the Fire Bee.
The Fire Fly was soon replaced with a more complex iteration, the Lightning Bug, the only drone
success story of the Cold War.109
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Fig. 9. An original Fire Bee drone110

Fig. 10. UAVs made by Ryan Aeronautical. 111

The Lightning Bug
The Lightening Bug reconnaissance drone was used extensively during the Vietnam War
to monitor China, North Vietnam, and North Korea. It was capable of flying at high altitudes,
similar to the U-2 spy plane, and was virtually untraceable by radar. These drones, which were
both remotely-controlled and auto-piloted over their targets, took pictures and proceeded to
predetermined locations where they would parachute for later recovery. In total, 3,435
Lightening Bug missions were flown throughout South East Asia between 1964 and 1975.112
The Lightning Bug’s success was not typical of Cold War drones, but the obstacles it
faced (technical limitations, competition from other surveillance technologies, and expense)
were. The UAVs often veered off their preprogrammed courses, producing pictures of no
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strategic value. They were damaged when parachuting to the ground, resulting in the
implementation of midair retrieval system (MARS). This solution not only made operations
more complex but also less effective. Initially, forty percent of lightning bugs were lost due to
midair recovery. The problems were resolved by 1972, when operations had a ninety-eight
percent recovery rate.113
Though not specified in their report, the drones discussed by McNamara and Vance in
1965 were definitely Lightning Bugs. Despite the drone failure, aerial reconnaissance over China
was still needed, and U-2s chosen for the task. Rather than drones, emphasis was put on further
developing another manned reconnaissance technology, project OXCART.114 OXCART was
designed to be the successor to the U-2, capable of higher altitudes and flight speeds.115
In a study for the Air Force Association’s Mitchell Institute, Thomas P. Ehrhard argues
the Lightning Bug only succeeded thanks to the opportunity provided by the Vietnam War,
including covert funding. The Air Force and CIA conducted joint drone research and
development under a classified organization called the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).
Lightning Bug production alone cost $1.1 billion, equivalent to $5.8 billion in 2010 when
Ehrhard wrote his study. Maintenance and operational costs greatly increased this figure, making
the Lightning Bug the most expensive UAV of its time.116
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Why not Drones.
Only the Lightning Bug managed to overcome these problems. Numerous other drones
were developed during the Cold War but were unsuccessful. Arguably the most ill-conceived
Cold War drone was the Lockheed D-21B, developed under the codename Tagboard. Test flights
began in 1964 with operations lasting until the program was canceled in 1971. Tagboard was
designed to conduct deep penetrating reconnaissance missions in hostile airspace.117 It could
reach an altitude of 95,000 feet and fly at a top speed of Mach 4, over 2,500 miles per hour.118
Tagboard’s primary target was the Chinese nuclear facility at Lop Nor, a remote salt lake in
Northwestern China. Since Lightning Bug drones were not feasible for reconnaissance at Lop
Nor, Tagboard’s importance grew as the Chinese conducted nuclear weapons tests during the
mid to late 1960s.119
There were major conceptual flaws with the Tagboard drones. Initially, the drones would
be “piggybacked” by an M-12 plane and launched before reaching dangerous airspace. The first
few launches were successful. During a flight on July 30, 1966, the drone collided with the
manned carrier; both aircrafts were destroyed and a crew member was killed. No more
piggyback missions were attempted. The carrying plane became the larger, more capable, B-52,
which could carry it like a bomb.120 These drones were also sacrificial. They would fly over the
target, photograph it, and return to a recovery zone. At the recovery zone, the film, camera,
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guiding system, and avionics would be ejected, but the drone itself would self-destruct.121
Willfully wasting these highly complex drones was not cost-effective.

Fig. 11. The Tagboard drone alone, carried by an M-12, and two carried by a B-52.122

An NRO document from March 20, 1970, detailed thirteen different Tagboard test
flights; they oft experienced technical difficulties. On November 6, 1967, the drone failed to
sustain its proper cruise flight; poor engine performance was suspected. On December 2, 1967,
“Flight,” was “terminated prematurely after failure of the hydraulic system and subsequent loss
of control.” Flight was “terminated prematurely” again on January 19, 1968. A flight on April
30, 1968, had a successful launch and boost but “was unable to sustain cruise and lost altitude
and speed due to low thrust from the engine.” The drone was destroyed. Only a few of the
thirteen test flights succeeded.123
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On December 17, 1970, a Tagboard reconnaissance mission over South China failed. The
drone successfully launched and flew its preprogrammed route. The “recovery package” with the
film was ejected at the correct location and on time. Recovery failed when the package
descended far too rapidly and crashed into the water. Searches followed, but the recovery
package appeared to have broken and sunk.124
A February 26, 1971, teleconference between then Secretary of State William Rogers and
National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger reveals the attitude of high level officials towards
Tagboard. President Nixon wanted to conduct a reconnaissance operation over China with
drones. Rogers had previously questioned the wisdom of using drones there, but subsequent
events changed his mind. He still noted that there was concern whether they would even work.
Kissinger remarked that “It was a flap both times.” With Rogers’ support, and opinion united,
Kissinger resolved to take the drone operation to the President.125
The last two of four Tagboard missions directed at the Lop Nor facility were conducted
in March 1971. They failed, just like the first two attempts. In the end, the drone provided no
reconnaissance intelligence on the Chinese nuclear facility.126 Supposedly, Tagboard had a
handful of other successful reconnaissance missions, but details remain classified. The program
was canceled in 1971, the remaining drones put in storage.127
More than technical problems plagued Tagboard. A 1965 document, which amounts to a
to-do list, includes part requisitions, development projections, and organizational goals. The
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document reveals the divided attention among multiple aerial surveillance projects, as well as
efforts placed on conserving resources. The needs of four different aerial reconnaissance projects
are discussed including: Tagboard, Dragon Lady (the codename for U-2 spy planes), SR-71
Blackbird, and Oxcart (the Lockheed A-12-- the proposed U-2 replacement). All were trying for
high altitude reconnaissance, but Tagboard was the only drone mentioned. Great attention was
put into trying to consolidate the needs of the different projects. Conservation efforts included
identifying “which Oxcart sensors… can be used in the SR-71 program” and determining “the
number of Y-J engines, if any, which the SR-71 program would want to acquire from the Oxcart
program.” A shopping list of spare Oxcart parts was to be prepared to supply the SR-71 program,
Tagboard, and Dragon Lady. These actions were prudent, but nonetheless reveal the concern
over the cost of these programs and the need to conserve resources.128
According to Ehrhard, Tagboard began with a budget of $31 million and costs increased
tenfold over the project’s history. He details numerous other Cold War drone projects including:
Compass Rose, the Advanced Airborne Reconnaissance System (AARS), the Elevated target
acquisition system (ELTAS), other Fire Bee variants, Condor, and more. They accomplished
little, but revealed the same problems: technical limitations, expense, and competition from other
aerial reconnaissance technologies. In 1974, the NRO dropped all of its drone projects in favor of
focusing on satellite reconnaissance.129
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Rise of the Predator
Other than the Lightning Bug, only one other significant drone emerged from the Cold
War though it did not prove itself until the 1990s.130131In the late 1970s, the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began the Teal Rain program focused on the “research,
development, test and evaluation of experimental long endurance vehicles.”132 Aeronautical
engineer Abe Karem led a development team in the creation of a UAV prototype. He based its
design around the anatomy of an albatross, and named it after the bird. Karem criticized the
designs of other drones for copying manned aircraft and thus not being as aeronautically efficient
as possible. The albatross’ long wingspan was the primary inspiration, allowing more efficient
and longer flights.133 Looking to nature for technical innovation continues today: the military is
currently funding the study of dragonflies for possible drone applications.134 After a successful
demonstration in which an Albatross prototype stayed in flight for fifty-six hours, Karem’s
company, Leading Systems, received funding from DARPA. 135 The primary strategic advantage
of Karem’s prototype was its long flight times, which enabled it to “loiter” over targets when
conducting reconnaissance missions.136 The military’s choice to use the word loiter is interesting;
it suggests the machines are up to no good. Karem and Leading Systems developed two more
130
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iterations, the Amber and Gnat 750, but financial problems led Karem to sell his designs to
defense contractor General Atomics, which eventually developed the drone into the most
significant yet, the Predator and Reaper.137

Fig. 12. Abe Karem and the Albatross prototype. 138

Fig. 13. The modern Predator drone.139

Though Karem conceived of the drone in the late 1970s, the Predator did not prove itself
until the Bosnian conflict in the mid-nineties. By this time, UAV development was consolidated
and managed by the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program (DARP), part of the larger
Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office. DARO published a UAV annual report for fiscal year
1996, including events from 1995. The report praised Predator’s accomplishments. UAV
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operations in Bosnia were the year’s main “success story” and Predator had been the most active
of the various UAVs discussed.140
In fiscal year 1996, Predator flew over 530 missions for over 2,500 flight hours; 159 of
the missions and 1,169 of the hours were over Bosnia. The drone’s video streams sent the longsought “common picture of the battlefield” to receiving sites in-theater and in the US. The
DARO report claimed that Predator use “helped determine the course of the Bosnian conflict.”
Predator’s ability to loiter in the air and provide long term surveillance revealed Serbian weapons
movement as well as confirming that there had been no effort at withdrawal. The DARO report
says this Predator-provided intelligence was the key to convincing NATO commanders to
resume the bombing campaign, which led to the Dayton peace accord in December 1995.141
Congressional review of the Department of Defense’s drone use also mentions Predator
contributions to maintaining the cease-fire in Bosnia including “detecting troop movements in
unauthorized areas, discovering previously unknown weapons factories or depots, and locating
units that were breaking the peace.”142 The military now had a drone with potential.
Predator’s successes went beyond Bosnia. In 1995 and 1996, it was the first UAV to
utilize both SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) and advanced satellite links.143 Predators were also
tested in naval exercises. A Predator demonstration involved a drone being controlled by a
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submerged Submarine; the drone transmitted its video stream back to the underwater vessel.
Another test included a Predator supporting a carrier battle group.144
Despite these accomplishments, Predator still faced the same obstacles as the drones that
preceded it. Predator’s full, weaponized potential wasn’t revealed until 2001 when it first fired a
Hellfire missile.145 In the 1990s, DARO’s UAV vision was limited; a report has their
presumptive slogan “Supporting the Warfighter” on every page.146 Restricting UAV
development solely to support roles made Predator secondary to other UAVs. In the same 1996
DARO UAV report which praised Predator’s accomplishments in Bosnia and its various new
feats, “program prioritization” was placed on other projects. “The number one priority for UAVs
remains the tactical UAVs (Outrider and Pioneer).” Predator came second to the drones which
provided immediate tactical aid to battlefield forces.147 This nonetheless demonstrates progress
for drone adoption. Cold War drones had been outdone by manned reconnaissance planes and
satellites. Finally, viable drone choices existed.
Predator also faced technical issues. Initially, the UAV had operational limitations based
on weather. During missions the drone’s wings would ice up, though a remedy was quickly
found. After the Bosnian missions, technical improvements were needed including “an allweather sensor” and the need for “all-weather flight capability.” The communication links also
needed development, to enable conversations between drone pilots and air traffic control, as well
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as better utilization of the video streams provided by Predators. These issues were overcome,
though problems still remain.148
Predator adoption was not inevitable; it took over two decades for its potential to be
recognized. Like the Lightning Bug, the Predator faced the same problems as other drones.
These drones’ successes, however, were brought on because they proved their capabilities at
opportune moments: Vietnam for the Lightning Bug, Bosnia and especially the War on Terror
for the Predator. Besides greater adoption, the Predator’s demonstration of UAV potential had an
even wider effect on American foreign policy and military analysis.
Foreign Drone Proliferation
American recognition of UAV potential in the mid-1990s coincided with concern over
international drone proliferation. Previously, foreign interest in drones had been recognized.
America supplied Israel’s drone needs. In a July 27, 1970, conversation, during the EgyptianIsraeli War of Attrition, then Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin complained to Kissinger about
Egyptian and Soviet interception of Israeli Skyhawk planes. A reconnaissance drone shipment
had just been delivered, for operations too dangerous for manned planes. The type of drones
were not specified, but, based on the year, they were most likely Lightning Bugs. 149
Chinese interest in drones was not welcome. In 1976, China wanted to purchase twenty
Fire Bee drones, the base target drone from which the Lightning Bug was modified, from
Teledyne-Ryan Aeronautical Company.150 Ryan Aeronautical had been sold to Teledyne in
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1969.151 On July 12, 1976, the prospect of selling drones to China was debated in a State
Department meeting with Secretary Kissinger, Under Secretary Philip C. Habib, and other
advisors. The primary concern was that China would modify the simple Fire Bee target drone to
something more advanced, as America had done. The conversation, however, shows the
disparaging attitudes towards drones at the time:
Kissinger: We have to draw the line somewhere, though drones don’t really
bother me.
(East Asian expert) William H. Gleysteen Jr.: They’re a waste of money.
Under Secretary Habib: It’s their money.

Politics, not the fear of Chinese drone development, was the deciding factor. Kissinger wanted to
delay until after the Republican National Convention. Habib noted Teledyne’s persistence,
saying “they’ll be up on the Hill.” He had already received calls from the congressman who
represented the factory’s district. Ultimately, Kissinger did not want to have Chinese pursuit of
American military technology as an issue for the next six weeks and decided to “spin it out” with
Teledyne.152
This early concern was minimal. If America, the superpower, could not create viable
drones, there was little concern as to what other nations might make. The shift came in the 1990s
once drones had actually proven themselves. In 1996, DARO noted the rapid international
proliferation of drones over the previous decade. In 1986, there were eighteen nations with UAV
programs. By 1991, thirty-three nations were working on drones; fifty nations had them by 1996.
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DARO’s objective was for America to stay ahead and have domestic UAVs to set the world
standard.153 It was recognized, however, that “Adversaries have UAVs.”154
Though not directly stated, one of these adversaries was China. In 1997 the Secretary of
Defense submitted a report to Congress detailing China’s efforts to modernize its military. The
report argued that “China’s long-term goal is to become one of the world’s great powers.” UAV
development was one, among many, pieces of evidence used to show China’s progress. The
report singled out specific drones, “particularly those with extended ranges or loitering times.”
These were the capabilities which Predator had recently proven to be of value.155 The report was
taken seriously. Congressman Floyd D. Spence, Chairman of the House National Security
Committee, issued a press release equating the report to “the clearest official acknowledgment to
date that China views the United States as the greatest obstacle to its ambition to become a great
power and that China is developing the military capabilities needed to achieve its goal.”156
Chinese drones were mentioned in the next year’s analysis as well. Drones with “potential strike
capabilities” were the new threat.157
Similarly, concern over foreign weaponized drones seems to have emerged once America
had proven this capability. Predator drones were first made lethal during a February 2001
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weapons test in which the drone fired a laser guided hellfire missile at a stationary target. 158
Former CIA operative Henry A. Crumpton suggests that this deadly turn was prompted by a
significant missed opportunity. In the late 1990s unarmed Predators had spotted Osama Bin
Laden during a surveillance mission but lacked the ordnance to execute him themselves. An
attack from another source would have taken too long.159
By the end of 2001, the American military focused on UAVs from other nations which
had the same potential. In December 2001, the National Air Intelligence Center produced
classified reports analyzing foreign drone development. One was a datasheet on general UAV
developments; it noted that “Operational weaponized UAVs are starting to proliferate” and that
“a few countries have attempted to convert manned aircraft to unmanned weapon delivery
vehicles.” The majority of the report was spent detailing the capabilities of over one-hundred
foreign drones. Most of the details were redacted.160 A second report dealt specifically with
weaponized foreign drones which were considered “one of the most versatile weapon systems
available to foreign battlefield commanders of today.” The report argued that “weaponized
UAVs pose an immediate airborne threat because of development and production activities in
high-interest countries.” America had developed lethal drones; now it worried about others.161
Drones struggled to succeed during the Cold War. As with the Kettering Bug and
Operation Aphrodite, when drone programs faced overwhelming problems, whether from
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expense, technical limitations, or superior competing technology, they were recognized and
misguided efforts were suspended. This should not be seen as a failure but as the military
recognizing its own limitations and accepting them, a relevant lesson for today.
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CHAPTER THREE:
AMERICAN COUNTERINSURGENCY: THE PHOENIX PROGRAM IN
VIETNAM AND CONTEMPORARY DRONE POLICY
The development of technologically-advanced UAVS has led to an expansion of their
use, much of it controversial. The most contentious use of drones has been their integration into
counterinsurgency efforts, serving as assassination tools against militants, often outside of
official warzones, in places such as Yemen, Somalia, and, most frequently, Pakistan. Recent
Drone policy has been much-criticized. Just as UAVs are not new; the flawed policies which
govern their contemporary use are not new either.
The Vietnam War suggests an important parallel-- The Phoenix Program. This was a
counterinsurgency initiative to neutralize an American enemy, the Viet-Cong-Infrastructure
(VCI.) The historical parallels between these two programs are numerous, both suggesting
conceptual flaws. Phoenix’s relevance to contemporary counterinsurgency efforts with drones
goes beyond historical parallels. David Kilcullen, a distinguished counterinsurgency advisor,
criticizes America’s drone use in Pakistan, advocating traditional counterinsurgency as the
solution.162 He feels the solution to the spread of militant Islam is a “Global Phoenix
Program.”163 Kilcullen is not the only one who clings to the memory of Phoenix as a successful
operation. Alfred McCoy discusses Phoenix’s influence on the CIA and high level officials such
as Donald Rumsfeld during the War on Terror.164 Others in the military recognize the flaws in
traditional counterinsurgency, viewing drones as the solution. The Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College published a study on drone effectiveness by political scientist James
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Walsh. He advocates drones as the solution to the issues of counterinsurgency: avoiding
American loss of life, improved intelligence gathering, and improved precision when using
deadly force.165 In reality, an examination of Phoenix not only reveals it to be a poor program,
but that contemporary drone use suffers from many of the same problems. Both lacked adequate
military intelligence resulting in few strategically significant accomplishments. Such
counterinsurgencies, waged amongst the populace, caused excessive civilian casualties. Local
hearts and minds turned against American action. The covert nature of these programs also led to
corruption. Media revelations produced local public outrage, further turning the populace against
the overall military operation. These problems not only demonstrate misguided policy but
suggest the difficulties in such programs.
What is a successful counterinsurgency? Simply put, it is an attritional effort which
grinds down the opposing insurgency, while enabling the local populace to execute its own
security needs. The assumption is that the insurgency’s limited resources will bring the greater
power success. Winning the hearts and minds of the populace is also an essential goal. The
occupation and security force provided by the occupying power cannot last forever; the local
population must be prepared, eventually, to protect and govern itself. There is a great deal of
justified cynicism concerning America’s invasions, often likening them to neo-colonialism. In
Vietnam, America ostensibly tried to stop the spread of communism by creating a puppet state.
Recent American action in the Middle East is frequently dismissed as an effort to control oil.
Were it possible to have a successful counterinsurgency it would be an inherently anti-colonial
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effort, first expelling troublemakers, then preparing the locals to handle their own security.166
American counterinsurgencies in Vietnam and the Middle East failed to accomplish these goals.
As is common with the Vietnam War, the legacy of the Phoenix program is heavily
debated, with competing interpretations on virtually every aspect. Phoenix was a
counterinsurgency effort carried out by the CIA, American military, and South Vietnamese
military which targeted the VCI, a group composed of civilians who provided political support to
the military efforts of the Viet Cong. Phoenix began as a hodgepodge of American efforts, later
organized into ICEX (Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation Program) in 1967. Later that
year ICEX was renamed Phoenix, or Phung Hoang in Vietnamese, with CIA and American
military funding and oversight of the largely Vietnamese effort. It was one of many programs
within the overall Pacification effort, to strengthen the South and weaken the North.
Pacification’s support for the South ranged from economic and social reform to traditional
military support against the Communist North.167
The stated goal of the Phoenix program was to “eliminate” or “neutralize” the VCI.
Eliminate was changed to neutralize, because of public outrage in America.168 Neutralization
came about when a member of the VCI had been captured, rallied, or killed. The ideal situation
for Phoenix operations was to capture someone in the VCI and convert them to supporting the
American effort. Committed members of the VCI who would not cooperate were often coerced
through torture to provide information. According to official Government of Vietnam (GVN)
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numbers, Phoenix “neutralizations” resulted in 40,994 deaths.169 The differing interpretations of
Phoenix largely stem from which aspect of the program is emphasized and how much is
acknowledged. Phoenix defenders, such as Guenter Lewy, or its director, William Colby,
emphasize the positives (intelligence-gathering efforts); critics such as Douglas Valentine and
Alfred McCoy, emphasize deaths and torture. The flaws in counterinsurgency efforts that arose
during Phoenix have been carefully documented.170
There are contemporary parallels. Recent drone policy has utilized combat UAVs in
Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, and Yemen, but this study focuses on their use in Pakistan. North
Waziristan, on the border with Afghanistan, has been the primary target for American drone
strikes outside of official warzones. At the time of writing, The Bureau of Investigative
Journalism has counted 383 drone strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and 2014. This dwarfs the
some seventy confirmed drone strikes in Yemen, or up to 8 in Somalia.171 The Obama
administration has been primarily responsible for America’s drone war, which peaked in 2010,
when 122 drone strikes were launched in Pakistan.172 The primary goal of these drone operations
has been the targeted killing of terrorists.
A comparison of Phoenix with contemporary drone use reveals the self-defeating
problems of counterinsurgency. The obstacles can be divided into three broad categories:
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inefficiency, civilian casualties, and corruption. These mistakes often feed into each other,
weakening the overall effectiveness of the programs.
1. Inefficiency: Inadequate Intelligence, Imprecision, and Low-Level Deaths
Inefficiency plagued the Phoenix program and contemporary drone use. A lack of
intelligence about the enemy contributed to imprecision, resulting in low-level or innocent
people being harmed.
A. Intelligence Inadequacy
The first major reason for inefficient drone policy has been a lack of military intelligence.
This is ironic-- Abe Karem’s Predator prototypes were designed for surveillance and
intelligence-gathering. While drones have provided valuable Intel, both in and out of combat,
their lethal uses have often been misguided.
America’s disinclination to commit troops to military efforts in Pakistan is the primary
reason for the lack of intelligence. Our campaign to date has relied mostly on UAVs to target and
kill insurgents. After years of unpopular war in Iraq and Afghanistan, political and military
leaders have been wary to commit ground troops to a counterinsurgency effort in Pakistan. Nor
would Pakistani officials have consented to an American occupation. Traditional
counterinsurgency, however, calls for a ground deployment allowing troops to gain intelligence
through local interaction.
The absence of a ground presence in Pakistan led to a heavy reliance on technology.
Using National Security Agency documents leaked by Edward Snowden and the accounts of
drone operators, Jeremy Scahill and Glenn Greenwald reported that the NSA has been heavily
involved with drone strike targeting. One NSA project, code named “GILGAMESH,” uses a
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device implanted on a Predator drone to geolocate the SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) card
inside cell phones. The GILGAMESH program is primarily used by the Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC) to track and target insurgents for execution. A second NSA program called
“SHENANIGANS” used a different instrument to collect data from wireless routers, computers,
smart phones, or other electronic devices for the CIA. As impressive-- or intimidating-- as this
spy technology sounds, there are numerous problems which hamper their value for accurate
intelligence-gathering.173
According to a former JSOC drone operator, military incompetence and ingenuity from
targeted insurgents frequently made the NSA’s intelligence-gathering devices ineffective. Many
drone strikes were based solely around the cell-phone’s SIM card, not the content of phone calls.
Insurgents recognized America’s ability to manipulate technology against them, and devised
practices to protect themselves from targeting. Numerous militants simply purchased multiple
SIM cards, making their cell phone difficult to track. Insurgent leaders also distributed their old
cell phones to others within their organization, friends, or family members, making the previous
connection of a targeted militant and their SIM card inaccurate. This has led to drone strikes on
civilians who possessed a cell phone which had previously been connected to a legitimate
militant target. A former drone operator also said that during meetings, insurgents would put all
of their SIM cards into a bag, mix them, and then take a new random one, defeating the NSA’s
efforts to connect specific militants to traceable SIM cards.174
Ultimately, this reliance on technology amounts to the targeting of cell phones, not
people; inaccuracy is worsened by the lack of other intelligence sources. Supposed safeguards
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were in place to maintain precision. Before carrying out a drone strike, the target is supposed to
be identified by at least two intelligence sources. However, both sources often originated in NSA
technology, not human intelligence. Another safety measure was that drone strikes had to be
carried out within sixty days after being approved by the President. However, one former drone
operator believes this restriction led military commanders to act rashly, approving drone strikes
when civilians were present, fearing otherwise being unable to kill the targeted insurgents. 175
This hands-off approach to intelligence-gathering resulted in inadequate information
about the majority of those killed. The identities of major terrorist leaders executed by drones are
obviously known because more effort is put into their assassination; their deaths bolster the
success of the overall drone program. However, according to analysis of drone strikes from The
New America Foundation, only two percent of the people killed in drone strikes have been high
level targets.176 The majority of people killed in drone strikes are labeled “militants.” However,
this label is misleading. The Obama administration classifies any adult male killed in Pakistan by
a drone strike as a militant, unless posthumous intelligence clears his name. This approach to
targeting suggests disinterest in accumulating intelligence before someone is targeted. A former
senior intelligence officer concluded that “they count the corpses and they’re not really sure who
they are.”177
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Former CIA director Leon Panetta championed his agency’s efforts with drones as “the
most effective weapon” against terrorism. However, many within the administration consider
drone operations in Pakistan to simply be the best of several unpalatable choices.178

Fig. 14. North Waziristan, Pakistan, where most drone strikes occur. 179

Traditional military thinking claims that a ground presence would resolve America’s
intelligence issues in Pakistan. A 2009 US Army Combined Arms Center briefing by Col. Trey
Turner and Major Jay Adair reveals how drones were supposed to be implemented into
counterinsurgency efforts. The briefing reviewed operations in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 2008.
One of the main conclusions: “Optimal employment of UAVs demands a nuanced understanding
of the environment gained only through interaction with the population on the ground.”
Interaction with the Kandahar locals was a requirement for proper intelligence gathering.
According to the briefing, the UAVs would primarily be used for “Targeting” and “Precision
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collection” and to “Understand the Environment,” or “Find the enemy.” Adequate intelligence
efforts would utilize both local population and drone technology. Destruction would come from
ground forces, conducting “Fix and Finish” operations against insurgents. The briefing’s
suggestions for UAV implementation counter America’s lethal implementation of drones in
Pakistan.180
The tactical briefing warns against the adoption of the one-sided approach developed in
Pakistan. In its discussion of proper UAV implementation, it asserts “If all you have is a
hammer, everything looks like a nail.” It asserted that proper intelligence and understanding is
necessary, impossible without ground assistance. General Stanley McChrystal is quoted as
saying “Air power contains the seeds of our own destruction if we do not use it responsibly, we
can lose this fight.” In both lethal and non-lethal encounters, whether the force came from a
drone or soldiers, the importance of further intelligence-gathering with ground troops engaging
in face-to-face communication was emphasized as an essential part of the overall
counterinsurgency effort.181
A strategic research project written by then-Lieutenant Colonel Ken Tovo for the United
States Army War College also emphasizes the necessity of a human presence in proper
counterinsurgency. Though Tovo’s paper is not discussing UAV use, his argument is similar to
that presented in the UAV briefing and remains relevant. Tovo emphasizes the importance of
local cooperation and participation. He essentially advocates the necessity of winning the hearts
and minds of the local population. He says:
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Focused operations require a level of cultural understanding and local area knowledge
that only a native can achieve. Attempts to operate unilaterally, without such expertise,
can result in indiscriminate use of force and firepower, lost opportunities and a
disenchanted, anti-American civilian population.

The lack of an American presence in Pakistan, as UAVs rain laser guided missiles on the
inhabitants, has resulted in just what Tovo cautions against.182
Arguably the most important and influential critic of America’s drone policy has been
David Kilcullen. An expert on counterinsurgency, he served as Chief Strategist in the Office of
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department in 2005 and 2006, senior counterinsurgency advisor for General David Petraeus in 2007 and 2008, special advisor for counterinsurgency to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and, more recently, as an adjunct professor in
International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. Kilcullen’s critiques of drones echo Tovo’s
thoughts on counterinsurgency efforts, emphasizing the necessity of involving the populace.
Kilcullen’s ideal counterinsurgency effort relies on local partnerships which would allow the
Pakistani people to begin handling their own security needs and isolate extremists from the
communities they inhabit. This directly contrasts America’s top-down efforts, distancing its
soldiers by exclusively using lethal UAV force.183
Intimidation is at the heart of insurgency, extremists wielding power over those they
terrorize. According to Kilcullen, the key to defeating insurgency is removing an insurgent’s
power to intimidate, “something that strikes cannot do.” He insists a troop presence is required in
proper counterinsurgency. He uses a burglar allusion:
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Imagine, for example, that burglars move into a neighborhood. If the police were to start
blowing up people’s houses from the air, would this convince homeowners to rise up
against the burglars? Wouldn’t it be more likely to turn the whole population against the
police? If their neighbors wanted to turn the burglars in, how would they do that, exactly?
Yet this is the same basic logic underlying the drone war.

With no American presence in Pakistan, the local population’s primary experience with those
ostensibly trying to help them are missiles strikes. With no one present to provide aid or improve
security, terrorized locals have no choice but to submit to militant rule. Anti-American sentiment
will grow when Pakistanis’ sole experience is having family and friends killed, or homes
destroyed.184
Military thinkers place faith in the ability of an American troop presence to improve
intelligence collection and counterinsurgency efforts. Cooperation and involvement with the
local population is much-valued. America’s failure to establish adequate intelligence networks is
just one of many factors which make counterinsurgency so difficult. Phoenix’s efforts included a
direct American presence and heavy Vietnamese involvement but still suffered the same
problems.
On November 25, 1967, Directive 381-43 from the U.S. Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam (MACV) laid out the proper intelligence gathering practices for ICEX, the program
renamed Phoenix later in 1967. Substantial requirements were put in place to ensure only
legitimate targets. Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRUs) initially needed to report a suspect’s
name, position, rank, and function. Once apprehended, the elimination method of the VCI
suspect, whether killed, captured, or convinced to defect, also needed to be filed. ICEX members
would conclude their intelligence reports by disclosing the current location and status of the
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individual, plus any valuable information obtained during the operation. These were the high
ambitions at the outset of the program. Though killing VCI members was an acceptable form of
elimination, those involved considered intelligence acquisition as the primary goal.185
Within three years intelligence-gathering was inadequate. Robert Komer, headed Civil
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) which oversaw the Pacification
effort, including Phoenix. He wrote an internal report entitled “The Phung Hoang Fiasco” which
critiques the intelligence efforts of the Vietnamese branch of the Phoenix Program. Dossiers on
VCI targets were described as “incredibly poor.” Most neutralization attempts lacked adequate
information to justify the pursuit of a supposed VCI target. Fingerprinting, a relatively simple
method to document the identity of possible insurgents, was rarely used. The report also noted
inadequate information extracted in post-capture interrogations. Ultimately, this lack of
information led to the same problem faced with contemporary drones: an indiscriminate effort
based on inadequate information which harmed innocent people.186
One reason for this failure to conduct informed operations was an unwise quota system,
an attempt to quantify results. Internal neutralization statistics from 1970 reveal that the calendar
year was divided into four quarters, each with a neutralization goal (one region’s goal was
1,050.)187 This quota system simply put pressure on Phoenix operatives to conduct a high
number of operations, rather than encouraging well-informed and fruitful action. The quota
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system also resulted in imprecise sweep operations which detained and persecuted innocent
civilians.188
America’s failure to win the hearts and minds of the populace also contributed to
Phoenix’s poor intelligence-gathering. Because the population was not favorable to the American
cause, few provided information. This meant Phoenix frequently relied on paid informants. The
monetary reward for information encouraged informants to provide false reports simply to be
paid.189 America also resorted to torture to force information out of captives.190
Phoenix’s failures show that American ground troops and local participation is not the
cure-all for an ill-informed intelligence effort, or an inefficient program. In reality, it seems
unlikely that enough information could ever be gathered to ensure that innocents are never
harmed, raising questions of whether a counterinsurgency waged among a population is feasible.
Phoenix and drones sought precision in their operations, but additional tactical mistakes reduced
accuracy and effectiveness.
B. Imprecision
The precision of UAVs is supposedly one of their greatest assets. President Obama
defended his drone-strike-heavy approach to counterterrorism, saying “For the most part they
have been precise, precision strikes against al-Qaeda and their affiliates…”191 Technically he is
correct. The ability to launch a single laser guided missile into a target is certainly an
improvement over other aerial strikes. However, technical limitations have plagued
contemporary drone operations.
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The way drone strikes are carried out, with operators frequently located on the other side
of the globe from the war-machine they control, makes the complex camera system extremely
important. For Predator and Reaper drones, one operator is solely dedicated to navigating the
UAV while another controls the optics and missile targeting. Unfortunately, the optics of
Predator and Reaper drones have revealed a phenomenon called the “soda straw” effect. Seeking
an accurate missile strike, the targeting operator must zoom in closely on the target. It is this
close-up on a target and loss of peripheral vision which causes the soda straw effect, the analogy
being that it is “like viewing a small amount of liquid through a soda straw, instead of the entire
glass.”192 This reduction in vision damages the accuracy of drone strikes because of individuals
walking into the blast radius after a missile has already been launched, resulting in unintended
casualties.
Though these deaths are unintentional and caused by a technological limitation, America
is hardly absolved of culpability. American military officials are aware of UAV limitations.
When mistakes are made because of faulty technology, blame is assigned to the perpetrators. The
high demand for drones under President Obama has led major policy makers to encourage rushed
production contributing to these technological problems. One example came from former
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates who favored “75 percent solutions over a period of months”
rather than waiting an extended period for a “gold-plated” solution. In 2009, Colonel Eric
Mathewson, who directed the Air Force’s task force on drones, told The New York Times that
“The context was to do just the absolute minimum needed to sustain the fight now, and accept
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the risks, while making fixes as you go along.” This further places the blame for technical
limitations on the military leaders making decisions.193
The military had been working on a solution to the soda straw effect, though without
much success. Starting in 2007, DARPA supported defense contractor BAE Systems’
development of the Autonomous Real-time Ground Ubiquitous Surveillance-Imaging System
(ARGUS-IS.)194 The system’s name ARGUS references the mythological Greek figure with 100
eyes.195 As the reference suggests, ARGUS was a 1.8 billion pixel camera system which could
provide drone operators with 65 independent high-definition videos in real time.196 This would
have allowed operators to have both zoomed-in and out video streams as they conducted a drone
strike, thus maintaining peripheral vision of the blast area and hopefully eliminating the sodastraw effect. 197 However, the ARGUS-IS has been removed from DARPA’s list of active
projects and replaced with the ARGUS-IR, focused primarily around Infrared optics.198
In early 2013 when DARPA revealed the ARGUS-IS system to the public, it was still
being tested and had not yet been incorporated into drone strike operations. Its removal from
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DARPA’s active projects suggests the project’s goals have been abandoned or at least shifted.
The soda-straw effect still limits UAV accuracy.
Another major issue with UAV precision is the practice referred to as “double taps,”
where drones use multiple missiles to destroy targets.199 Double tap strikes often utilize multiple
drones at a time. One example in Pakistan used five drones and led to four missiles launched at a
single target.200 The discovery of this practice was actually revealed by an NYU student, Josh
Begley, who has used his twitter account @dronestream to document “Every reported US drone
strike” from 2002 to the present. 201 Begley’s efforts demonstrate the increasing difficulty of
maintaining the secrecy of covert operations. Since the double tap practice was revealed,
numerous media sources have investigated further, raising doubt about UAV accuracy. The need
for multiple missile strikes already harms UAV’s precision image, but increased civilian
casualties resulting from this practice has been the main concern. First responders, coming to aid
after the initial missile strike, are caught in the blast radius of the subsequent strikes.
There has been at least one instance of friendly fire from a drone strike. On April 5, 2011,
drone operators were trying to provide aid to ground troops in Afghanistan as they were attacked
by insurgents. Muzzle flashes from the weapons of American troops were thought to be coming
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from the attacking insurgents. A missile was launched at the Americans, resulting in two
deaths.202
Phoenix also sought precision and failed. Optimism was high when ICEX, Phoenix’s
forerunner, was first being organized. An ICEX briefing from August 10, 1967 held the hope that
as the program developed “an ever increasing “rifle shot” approach rather than a shotgun
approach” would be used to eliminate the VCI.203 The expected result of this selective use of
force would remove enemies without harming the general populace.
In reality, Phoenix operations frequently resembled the blunderbuss rather than rifle.
Phoenix’s quota system put pressure on operatives to produce numbers. This frequently resulted
in cordon-and-sweep operations which affected innocent civilians. Innocent people would be
detained as suspected VCI in jails and holding areas, often for weeks or months until they were
processed or escaped. These practices ultimately served the VCI more than the American effort.
The actual VCI in these jails could indoctrinate their previously neutral civilian cellmates to their
ideology and enhance it with the American abuse they were suffering.204
Very little was gained from these efforts. The imprecision of Phoenix is apparent in the
scores of people it neutralized. American statistics counted 81,740 supposed VCI
neutralizations, 26,369 of whom were killed. The GVN said there had actually been 40,994
deaths.205 By the end of 1969 the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam estimated that 75-
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90 percent of the supposed VCI captured were released or received short jail sentences. Guenther
Lewy notes that the majority of suspects “were not neutralized for long, if at all.”206
C. Low-Level Deaths
A primary goal of American counterinsurgency has been to eliminate the insurgency’s
leadership, a discriminatory application of force, aimed at egregious offenders. Conventional
wisdom holds that an organization minus its leaders is no longer a threat. Contemporary drone
policy and the Phoenix Program have championed this approach. However, the actual strategic
progress gained from the death of insurgent leaders has been repeatedly challenged. Despite
efforts at top-down damage to insurgency groups, the primary result of both programs has been a
high, but insignificant, body count.
There are two metrics commonly used to analyze military operations, measures of
performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs.) MOPs are a tactical evaluation of
how well an action was executed. MOEs are a more developed, strategic, analysis of an action’s
effectiveness in achieving overall objectives. Ken Tovo argues that the Phoenix Program
mistakenly conflated the two different metrics. Phoenix took an MOP-- the VCI neutralization
totals--and considered them to be MOEs. The number of neutralized VCI demonstrated that
Phoenix operatives were taking action against the enemy; however it did not analyze the
significance of the neutralizations. Numbers alone did not analyze whether the overall goal of
reducing the VCI’s control of the population had been advanced. In the end, Phoenix neutralized
tens of thousands, but the control over the population, and the war, was lost.207
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The targeting of insurgent leaders is another instance of conflating MOPs with MOEs.
Phoenix and drone policy view killing insurgent leaders as an accomplishment without analyzing
how much the enemy has truly been hurt, or the strategic progress made from their deaths. Tovo
argues that the death of insurgent leaders means little unless “issues such as replacements,
criticality [sic] of losses, or minimum required personnel levels to direct operations” are
considered. “Useful MOEs,” he notes “require a significant understanding of the enemy, the
capability to collect detailed feedback on effects, and major analytical effort.” In other words,
abundant intelligence is needed to know the effect of a counterinsurgency’s actions.208
David Kilcullen, discussing drones and the War on Terror, raises another issue resulting
from specifically targeting insurgent leaders: personalizing the conflict. He argues that the effort,
resources, and bounties devoted to locate terrorist leaders distracts from more important
problems and turns the terrorist into a Robin Hood figure. He also notes the insignificance of an
insurgent leader’s death. Kilcullen uses the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of Al
Qaeda in Iraq in 2006, as proof. It took just 18 days for Al Qaeda to replace Zarqawi and resume
operations.209
The pursuit of insurgent leaders characterizes Phoenix and modern drone policy. Phoenix
always sought to neutralize high-level VCI members. When ICEX was first organized in 1967,
the “rifle shot” precision was specifically directed towards the elimination of “important political
leaders and activists in the VC infrastructure.” VCI members were divided into three classes: A
for leaders; B for cadre members; and C for low-level supporters. Those in class A or B were
supposed to be the main targets.210 Struggling with this goal, a new experiment was attempted.
208

Ibid, 12.
David Kilcullen and Andrew Mcdonald Exum, "Death From Above, Outrage Down Below."
210
"ICEX Briefing.”
209

64

On June 30, 1971, the Psyop Policy division of the Joint United States Public Affairs
Office (JUSPAO) directed Phung Hoang to begin testing a high value rewards program in the
Quang Nam, Binh Dinh, Bien Hoa, and Vinh Binh provinces. If successful the program was to
be expanded. The goal was to “elicit information leading to the neutralization of specific high
level VCI cadre by payment of large cash rewards.” In addition to weakening VCI leadership, a
primary concern was what effect large rewards would have on the Vietnamese population.
Control of the population was a major goal of Phoenix, and counterinsurgencies in general;
JUSPAO assumed that in the struggle against communism, capitalism would help.211
Phoenix’s efforts actually affected insignificant members of the VCI. In January 1969,
Richard M. Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, wrote a report on the overall
Pacification effort, including specifics about Phoenix. Helms endorsed Phoenix’s pursuit of the
VCI, while noting its inefficiency. At this point, thirteen thousand members of the VCI were
purportedly killed, captured, or convinced to defect. Helms noted that the total probably included
“individuals improperly identified as members of the infrastructure; it certainly includes large
numbers of low level cadres who can be replaced fairly easily. The numbers of key cadre
eliminated is quite small, since they are the most difficult to find.”212 Poor intelligence hindered
operations; legitimate targets went unpunished. Finding replacements for the affected
insignificant members, already easy thanks to their simple roles, became even easier as antiAmerican sentiment grew out of abuse.
These problems remained constant. A Pentagon contract study on Phoenix operations
from 1970 through 1971, coinciding with the extra emphasis from the bounty program, found
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that ninety-seven percent of the Viet Cong targeted were of negligible importance. Fewer than
half of the supposed VCI captured or killed by Phoenix were members of the Communist Party.
Even Robert Komer, the founder of the Phoenix Program, concluded that it had been a “poorly
managed and largely ineffective effort.”213 Non-combatants such as tax collectors and
propagandists were targeted for neutralization.214 From 1968-1971 only twenty-one percent of
those targeted for neutralization operated above the local level. All VCI were labeled “dangerous
leaders of the insurgency,” leading to such abuses as an eighty-year-old woman arrested for parttime commitment as a communist-liaison at the hamlet level.215
For all of the deserved criticism Phoenix has received, it at least coincided with an overall
Pacification effort which had redeeming qualities. American soldiers carried out civic action
programs, taught classes to Vietnamese children, improved hygienic standards in rural villages,
and more.216 In other words, a nominal attempt was made at winning the hearts and minds of the
South Vietnamese. Phoenix also attempted, through flawed methods, to accomplish a grand
strategic goal of neutralizing the VCI and winning over, or at least controlling, the local
population. The same cannot be said for America’s counterinsurgency efforts with drones in
Pakistan.
Drone policymakers have adopted the same top-down plan which Phoenix attempted,
once again with few results. The primary justification for drone use outside of official war zones,
in places such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, has been the pursuit of Al-Qaeda and associated
terrorist leaders. Though drones are criticized when mistakes are made, the successful
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assassinations of terrorist leaders are touted to justify their overall use. Terrorist assassination
and civilian casualties are the two primary narratives for America’s drone use; individuals tend
to emphasize one over the other, depending on their politics and sentiments. In reality, most who
are killed in drone strikes are nameless “militants,” a term which, as mentioned, has been defined
opaquely under the Obama administration. The death of these strategically insignificant
individuals has proven counterproductive.
The New America Foundation (NAF), drawing on reputable media reports, has entered
every American drone strike, 2004 to 2013, into a database. Their findings counter the Obama
administration’s rhetorical emphasis on drones killing terrorist leaders. The total death count
from drone strikes in Pakistan ranges from 2080 to 3428; only fifty-eight of those have been
known militant leaders, roughly two percent of those killed.217
The death toll from drone strikes is a contentious issue. For Pakistan, the NAF counts up
to 307 civilian deaths, and up to 334 of unknown affiliation. The Bureau of Investigative
Journalism counts up to 957 civilian deaths.218 Since the beginning of Pakistani drone strikes in
2004, 2013 saw the lowest number of civilian casualties; however this reduction coincides with a
drastic decrease in the overall number of strikes. This leaves the bulk of the deaths, up to 2787,
labeled as “militants.” The NAF makes no mention of the controversy surrounding this term,
suggesting at least some of those they counted as militants were simply male civilians.219
With no ground presence in Pakistan, there can be virtually no American effort to win the
support of the local populace. Pakistan’s government has regularly protested after drone strikes.
America’s action in Pakistan has lacked a tangible strategy, and it is unclear how the
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accumulation of dead militants helps. An American counterinsurgency has yet again conflated
MOPs for MOEs. Kilcullen sees no value in these operations--with no American presence there
is no way for the Pakistanis who would resist militant control to do so.220 Labeling all Pakistani
males “militants” also suggests the Obama administration cares little for gaining the support of
the local population. Replacing low-level militants becomes easy when no good-will effort has
been attempted. The counter-productivity resulting from collateral damage to civilians and
property from drone strikes has been an oft-noted critique. It increases anti-American sentiment,
fuels vengeful retribution, and turns previously neutral non-combatants into zealous insurgents.
The Phoenix Program and America’s modern drone policy have both been unsuccessful
efforts at counterinsurgency. America’s policies have wasted resources pursuing ill-defined
goals, resulting in a large body count, insignificant from a military point of view. These
attritional counterinsurgencies have sought to eliminate the enemy, but their policies made it
easier for the enemy to replenish its forces. As frustrating as fruitless military action is, the most
damning result of American attempts with counterinsurgency are the deaths of civilians caught in
the crossfire.
2. Civilian Casualties
Civilian casualties have always been a concern in war. However, the nature of an
insurgency fought out among the populace brings an even greater risk to innocents. War’s
inherent danger to civilian life directly contradicts a counterinsurgency’s attempts to protect and
win over the local populace.
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Political Scientist Colm McKeogh, traces the concern for civilian protection throughout
western civilization, culminating in the principle of non-combatant immunity which forbids
specifically targeting non-combatants for attack.
Hebrew, Greek, and Roman philosophers, poets and prophets decried violence against
women, children and prisoners…. The Jewish scriptures taught that the innocent ought
not to be punished for the crimes of the guilty…. Chivalric codes contributed the idea that
one ought not to harm the unarmed and defenceless. Enlightenment rationalism deplored
the waste and cruelty of war. And, finally, military professionalism focused on the skill
of gaining victory over armed opponents without massacre and wanton destruction.

Through the nineteenth century, every European power casually noted the rights of noncombatants. Civilian protection was the first limitation placed on war in international law.
Official recognition first came from the Hague Conferences in 1899 and 1907 and was succeeded
by the Nuremberg Trials and Geneva Conventions.221
Passed in 1977, Additional Protocol I to the Geneva conventions further laid out the
protection of civilians during war. Most importantly, the nations in conflict were to “at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and
military objectives.”222 The United States has signed but not officially ratified the addition. The
International Committee of the Red Cross has insisted that, ratified or not, it is part of
international law which binds the actions of every nation.223
This twentieth century formalization of the rights of civilians has coincided with a radical
shift in the ways wars are waged. In The Command of the Air, Giulio Douhet, an early and
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influential proponent for air power, emphasized the airplane’s ability to wage war against cities
and populations. Targeting the enemy’s industrial complex and morale were central tenets of his
argument, adopted during World War II by the United States, Britain, and Germany.224
Officially, American strategic bombing attempted to avoid civilian casualties during
World War II, at least in the European theatre. The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki and the even deadlier firebombing of Japanese cities such as Tokyo showed that
America seemingly cared little about the lives and property of civilians. The February 1945
firebombing of Dresden also suggests waning American interest in protecting German civilians.
Far from a uniquely American problem, this shift in warfare is evident in many nations’ military
doctrine, leading to a drastic increase in the number of civilian casualties. A 1999 study by the
International Committee of the Red Cross concludes: “The fundamental shift in the character of
war is illustrated by a stark statistic: in World War I, nine soldiers were killed for every civilian
life lost. In today’s wars, it is estimated that 10 civilians die for every soldier or fighter killed in
battle.”225
The Phoenix program was and drone policy has been hazy as to the distinction between
civilians and military. Douglas Valentine defines the Phoenix program as an assault on
civilians.226 The VCI inhabited a grey area between civilian and military, aiding the North
Vietnamese effort, primarily as non-combatants. For these non-combatant VCI, two of the three
neutralization techniques, capture and defection, may have been appropriate, but the third,
killing, was not. According to the South Vietnamese government, by the end of the program,
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over forty-thousand of the neutralizations led to death. American kill counts were 26,369.227 The
Obama administration’s overly-inclusive definition of militants also clouds the important
distinction between civilian and soldier.
These types of relationships are an inherent characteristic of an insurgency and suggest
the difficulty of America’s protecting civilians while trying to win a war. Blame for civilian
deaths is further complicated by the nature of insurgency, insurgents waging war behind the
civilian populace. This issue is largely responsible for America’s embrace of collateral damage:
“unintentional damage or incidental damage affecting facilities, equipment or personnel
occurring as a result of military actions directed against targeted enemy forces or facilities. Such
damage can occur to friendly, neutral, and even enemy forces.”228 Some, like Guenther Lewy,
endorse this rationalization, and blame the insurgents who purposefully endanger civilians in
their method of waging war: “If guerillas live and operate among the people like fish in the
water, then legally, the entire school of fish may become a legitimate military target.” Even if
Collateral Damage is accepted as a justified military doctrine, the Phoenix program and modern
drone policy have stretched its definition too far.229
Lewy’s thinking seems to be on a slippery slope; many have critiqued collateral damage
as utilitarian excuse. It essentially allows the American military to conduct any operation without
concern for civilian casualties as long as there is an ostensible military target. Such moral
absolutist philosophers as Thomas Nagel argue that the killing of non-combatants is never
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justified and is morally equivalent to murder.230 In unjust wars, which may or may not include
Vietnam and The War on Terror, Philosopher Jeff McMahan would place the guilt of any death,
civilian or not, on the aggressor who began the conflict. Every individual involved with the
unjust effort would be at fault for any death they caused, including foot soldiers acting in selfdefense.231
Both positions go too far; in reality, enough evil is present in war for each side to be
guilty. Every participant in an armed conflict is responsible for the discriminatory use of force
and adherence to the principle of non-combatant immunity. If the war involves an insurgency,
then both sides inevitably harm innocents. When the guilt for civilian deaths is being determined,
it seems silly to blame a foot soldier reacting to a hostile situation, even if the larger effort is
unjust. Though resulting civilian deaths from an American attack on a military target are
abhorrent, they are generally unintentional. An insurgency’s use of civilian shields is
premeditated. Yet, an insurgent effort, albeit unethical, may be strategically sound. The North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong had no hope of defeating America in a conventional war, but did so
in an unconventional manner. The results of the War on Terror seem to be the same. The death of
civilians is arguably the most important reason an insurgency succeeds. The opposing power’s
invasion and occupation leads to death and abuse which lends legitimacy to the opposing
insurgency. The validation of an insurgency allows it to be replenished and survive, making
attrition impossible. In Vietnam and the Middle East, insurgencies have proven very effective at
draining the will of America to wage war.
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Much of Phoenix’s legacy has been sensationalized by antiwar sentiment, from the 1970s
to the present. The secondary literature is divided as to what actually happened. Douglas
Valentine’s The Phoenix Program is considered by Phoenix critics to be the definitive work on
the subject though it has serious flaws.232 Moyar’s Phoenix and the Birds of Prey refutes
misinformation and some of Valentine’s wilder claims, such as his linking Phoenix to the My Lai
massacre.233
Phoenix was intended to target primarily civilians, or at least non-combatants.
The VCI was mainly a political organization which supported the Viet Cong military effort.
Officially, these non-combatants were supposed to be subjected to the police techniques of
neutralization, captured and hopefully rallied but not killed.234 However, there were numerous
instances where non-combatant VCI and unaffiliated civilians were abused or killed due to
Phoenix.
The Phoenix program was subjected to numerous Congressional and Senate hearings in
the early 1970s. These produced testimony revealing Phoenix’s poor leadership and
indiscriminate operations. Congressional hearings in 1971 demonstrated that between 1968 and
1971 Phoenix had killed 20,587 people identified as VCI. Each year’s death totals had outdone
the last.235 In 1971 William Colby, who took over for Robert Komer in leading CORDS and the
overall Pacification effort, including Phoenix, defended Phoenix’s idealized official policy,
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emphasizing Phoenix’s intelligence-gathering efforts over assassination.236 He did admit some
fault. When questioned by Congressman Ogden Reid, Colby said he was unsure that supposed
VCI members could be distinguished from loyal South Vietnamese citizens.237 By 1973, in
hearings for his nomination to become the Director of the CIA, Colby still defended Phoenix but
was willing to recognize that “a large number of activities went on that are quite frankly,
reprehensible.” Colby distanced himself and the program he led from criminal actions; others
revealed the truth in their testimony.238
In 1970, Komer’s report, “The Phung Hoang Fiasco,” noted the lack of evidence about
the people killed and casts doubts as to their VCI affiliation.239 This issue, and its repercussions,
was further revealed by Michael Uhl, part of a Military Intelligence Team connected to Phoenix,
who testified to Congress in 1971. His duties included interrogation and torture in the pursuit of
intelligence. Uhl rejected Colby’s testimony, insisting he had a “general lack of understanding of
what is actually going on in the field.” Uhl said that it was impossible that the tens of thousands
of VCI neutralizations tabulated could have been carried out according to the official policies
Colby presented. He described indiscriminate dragnet operations which led to those who “looked
good” being classified as VCI. When the captured Vietnamese were turned over to intelligence
workers like Uhl, enormous pressure was placed on them to be identified as civil defendants
(CDs) who had violated the law or been involved with the VCI. Uhl claimed that most of the
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CDs he dealt with were women and children.240 As Uhl indicated, and McCoy has detailed in
Torture and Impunity, torture was frequently used on those Phoenix captured. Using torture
against military personnel violated international law; using it against non-combatants and
innocent civilians damns Phoenix further.241
False imprisonment and torture was not the full extent of Phoenix’s abuses towards
civilians. Numerous stories from those involved with Phoenix operations have described
horrendous actions which occurred. Vincent Okamoto, a lieutenant with the 25th infantry division
in 1968, said that the typical pursuit of a suspect involved a “Phoenix team” (likely a PRU) going
into a village and forcing villagers to identify suspected VCI. Okamoto said that the pursuit of
VCI suspects he witnessed involved Phoenix operatives forcing a reticent informant into
cooperation. Phoenix teams would “put a sandbag over his head, poke out two holes so he could
see, put commo wire around his neck like a long leash, and walk him through the village” until
the informant identified the house of the suspect. Operatives would return at night and execute
the residents.242
Stories like this led many to term Phoenix an “assassination program.” This label is
troublesome because, as noted, Phoenix engaged in much more than simply killing VCI.
However, assassinations or targeted killings did take place. In his 1971 Congressional testimony,
Colby admits that limited wrongdoings occurred, but insisted they were carried out by
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individuals who acted in violation of official Phoenix policies.243 Though these actions may have
been outside the purview of Phoenix directives, testimony from others involved with Phoenix
argued that the issues were widespread, known, and ignored. David Sheridan Harrington was a
program officer in CORDS and involved with Phoenix operations. During Colby’s nomination
hearing in 1973, Harrington criticized him for his involvement with Phoenix and misleading the
public. Harrington echoed Uhl’s testimony, saying “large gaps existed between Phoenix policy in
Saigon and operations in the field.” Harrington insisted that Colby and other CORDS leaders
knew about Phoenix abuses.244
Harrington describes attending a high-level briefing in DaNang, 1969. Colby, regional
CIA director Harry Mustakos, and other military officials were there as well. According to
Harington, Mustakos gave a defensive presentation on the CIA’s involvement with the PRUs,
detailing the difficulties which led to more deaths than Colby and the CORDS command wanted.
He complained that the PRUs, made up of Vietnamese, were frequently out of the control of their
CIA handlers, killing too many people, and violating policy. Ultimately, Mustakos’ briefing
made it clear that “many abuses occurred at the operational level of the Phoenix program,
including widespread and uncontrolled assassinations.” Harington insisted that Colby’s previous
testimony was misleading because he knew about these widespread issues. Not only was he
aware of these problems, Harrington testified, but little was done to remedy them.245
A frequent excuse for military misdeeds is to downplay their frequency, noting only that
they violate official policy. The same reasoning is present in Lewy’s America in Vietnam, which
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attempts to assuage American guilt over Vietnam because misconduct was not officially
condoned.246 This reasoning makes little sense and is another complication to counterinsurgency
efforts which hinders their acceptance. Civilian abuse will never be an official policy but will
always happen in war. The fact that Phoenix and counterinsurgencies operate covertly enables
these abuses to be more effectively hidden, at least temporarily. When misconduct is finally
revealed, the effect is widespread public dissatisfaction, condemnation, and suspicion, reducing
support for the overall military operation and further hindering the possibility of a
counterinsurgency to succeed.
Supporters of America’s modern drone use also like to downplay civilian casualties. In a
speech on drone policy, President Obama piously declared: “before any strike is taken, there
must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured.”247 While still a high-level
counterterrorism adviser, current CIA director John Brennan attempted to downplay civilian
casualties from drone strikes, saying “despite the extraordinary precautions we take—civilians
have been accidently injured, or worse, killed in these strikes. It is exceedingly rare, but it has
happened.”248 However, external investigation has proven the official record to be false. The
Bureau of Investigative Journalism notes 416 to 957 civilian deaths in Pakistan. This may seem
low in the grand scale of war. Another interpretation of the statistics would be that each of the
383 supposedly precise strikes in Pakistan has averaged one to three civilian deaths.249 Living
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Under Drones, a joint study by the law schools of Stanford and NYU, refutes the official record,
documenting higher civilian casualties and immoral uses of drones.250
Double tap drone strikes have hindered precision, resulting in civilian casualties. After
the initial missile strike, first responders come to the area in an attempt to provide aid and
remove bodies from the wreckage. Islamic funeral tradition calls for burial rituals to be
conducted as soon as possible, increasing the presence of civilians at blast zones. The subsequent
missiles launched in double tap strikes frequently kill or injure those who have arrived on the
scene. Unlike the initial strike which would have presumably been directed at a military target,
the subsequent strikes mainly affect civilians. The fear of these subsequent strikes has also
delayed locals and humanitarian workers from providing emergency medical care.251
Double taps seem to violate the definition of Collateral Damage, in which civilian
casualties must be unintentional. Drone operators have live video streams of the targeted area.
The arrival of first responders would be visible to operators, suggesting that operators are aware
of the civilian presence before launching subsequent missiles.
These double tap strikes also bring American military action close to state terrorism.
There is little difference between sanctioned drone double taps and terrorist actions, also referred
to as double taps. A 2007 study by the Department of Homeland Security explained the double
taps carried out by militant Islamist group Hamas, saying “a device is set off, and when police
and other first responders arrive, a second, larger device is set off to inflict more casualties and
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spread panic.”252 The only significant difference between the Hamas double taps and the
American double taps is that the terrorists lack drones to carry out their attacks.
The Obama administration’s redefinition of “militants” to include all adult males is an
attempt to present drones as more precise while whitewashing the killing of noncombatant males
in drone strikes. It also suggests poor strategy. Indiscriminately labeling an entire populace as the
enemy is a strategic and moral blunder. It demonstrates a lack of concern for civilian casualties
or winning the support of the Pakistani people. The military has explicitly attempted to suppress
the tally of civilian deaths from drones. Brandon Bryant, a former drone operator turned vocal
critic of America’s policies, reported his personal experience with the cover-up of civilian
deaths. Bryant had a tragic experience with the soda-straw effect, the loss of peripheral vision
due to the cameras being zoomed in. Responsible for the drone’s targeting system, Bryant
accidentally killed an unseen child who entered the blast radius after the missile had been
launched. When Bryant questioned “Was that a kid?” military superiors responded that “No.
That was a dog.” Bryant reviewed the scene on video, confirming that the figure in question had
two legs, not four. Ultimately, Bryant was convinced this was a purposeful instance of civilian
casualty count suppression.253
Those killed by America’s drone policies are not the only ones harmed. At present time,
up to 1,639 Pakistanis have been injured as a result of drone strikes.254 Living Under Drones
analyzed the psychological effects that drones have had on Pakistanis. The ever-present threat of
a drone strike hitting their community has altered the behavior of those in the affected regions.
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Group meetings, including efforts to resolve tribal disputes, are shunned because they draw the
attention of drone operators.255 Up to 202 children have been killed by drones in Pakistan.256
This has led to parents keeping their children from attending schools.257 This fear of drones also
subdues the population without leaving negative physical evidence. Ultimately, Hap Arnold’s
desire of using Weary Willy drones to psychologically damage the populace has been realized in
the twenty-first century.258 However, his hope that this would help America win wars has been
proven false.
In reality, the anger generated from American drone use has been detrimental to military
goals. One of the main reasons Kilcullen has adamantly opposed drone operations in Pakistan is
that outrage has spread beyond the affected regions and throughout the country.259 A Pew
Research Center study supports this claim noting that drone use has caused a drastic reduction in
the Pakistani population’s support for American help in fighting extremist groups. The study
concluded that 74% of all Pakistanis consider America an enemy.260 The Pakistani government
frequently protests American action within its borders. Pakistan’s ambassador to the United
States, Sherry Rehman, has denounced drone strikes as counterproductive, advocating a different
approach to fighting terrorism.261 Faisal Shahzad, who attempted to detonate a car bomb in
Times Square, suggested during his trial that he was seeking vengeance in response to drone use.
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Drones have even toppled the Guantanamo Bay prison as the primary method of terrorist
recruiting.262

Fig. 15.Anti-drone protests in Pakistan, the use of English suggests the protests are for an American audience. 263 264

There are additional cultural inspirations for this pursuit of revenge against drone abuses.
The primary ethnic group of tribal North Waziristan, where most Pakistani drone strikes occur, is
the Pashtun or Pakhtun people. They live under an ancient and unwritten code of ethics called
Pashtunwali, translated as “the way of the Pashtuns” or “the code of life.”265 One of the nine
principles of Pashtunwali is Badal, the right to seek revenge against a wrongdoer. This right
verges on obligation, as the failure to exercise Badal results in the offended being stripped of his
honor. The cultural significance of honor is conveyed by the great Pashtun poet Khushal Khan
Khattak who wrote “Let the head be gone, wealth be gone, but the honour must not go, because
the whole of dignity of a man is due to this honour.” The importance placed on revenge creates a
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cyclical situation as most Badal results in responding Badal.266 Badal also has no time limit or
statute of limitations; the phrase “revenge is a dish best served cold” originated with the
Pashtun.267
Seeking revenge for a wrongdoing, especially the death of a friend or family member, is
far from uniquely Pashtun. However, its cultural formalization suggests it has a powerful
influence. Every person killed by a drone strike creates more enemies for America, who are
culturally obligated to seek revenge on America. The ill-will generated makes winning an
attritional counterinsurgency implausible if not impossible.
The common excuse for civilian casualties resulting from counterinsurgencies has been
advocacy for humanitarian intervention--more civilians would be killed if America did nothing.
This thinking is a fundamental part of counterinsurgency efforts. In response to allegations of
possible Geneva Convention violations, Colby insisted that Phoenix’s purpose was “to protect
the Vietnamese people from an intolerable and systematic campaign of terrorism and subversion
directed by the Viet Cong Infrastructure.”268 In a speech on drone policy, President Obama used
similar justifications, saying “To do nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far
more civilian casualties…. Remember that the terrorists we are after target civilians, and the
death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian casualties
from drone strikes. So doing nothing is not an option.”269 While it is true that the local
populations have suffered most from the Viet Cong and radical Islamic terrorists, this advocacy
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of force not only dismisses the numerous issues already raised but ignores the context of terrorist
actions.
Terrorist actions disproportionately affect local civilians; the motivation of this action is
frequently to oppose the American occupation. The Vietcong carried out gruesome deeds against
civilians, but did so for political reasons directed at those cooperating with the Americans.
Stanley Karnow discusses the selective brutality of the Viet Cong, relating an incident where two
South Vietnamese Policemen were dragged off a bus and publicly decapitated for their
cooperation.270 One justification for using monetary rewards for the high value target program
was that the Vietnamese who cooperated would be in grave danger.271 In CIA operative Frank
Snepp’s memoir about the fall of Vietnam, he says he feared for the former VCI whom Phoenix
had convinced to defect, as well as the Vietnamese Phung Hoang members.272 In the Middle
East, it is unclear how continued American presence will ease tensions. Osama Bin Laden’s
initial anti-American Jihad was in reaction to Saudi Arabia’s decisions after Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait. The Saudis preferred American military support, and declined Bin Laden’s offer of
military assistance. He was also angry because American, non-Muslims would enter the Islamic
holy sites, Mecca and Medina. In Iraq and Afghanistan, destabilization wrought by American
action has led to sectarian violence. The stated goals of the Phoenix program and drone policy
may seem noble, but it is disingenuous to ignore the context for insurgent actions and downplay
the violence directly inflicted by American action.
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Clearly, American drone policy needs revision. However, counterinsurgencies are covert
operations with details withheld out of tactical necessity. This has made public discourse and
criticism of the programs more difficult than it should be. The fact that drone operators and
commanders are isolated from the field of battle also makes assigning guilt more difficult.
President Obama has acknowledged this, noting that covert drone operations “can end up
shielding our government from the public scrutiny that a troop deployment invites. It can also
lead a president and his team to view drone strikes as a cure-all for terrorism.”273 Ultimately, this
lack of transparency under which Phoenix and drones operated leaves the responsibility of
revealing American indiscretions to the media. The revelation of American misdeeds stimulates
public outrage and more formal condemnation, turning the populace further against the war
effort.
3. Covert Corruption, the Media, and Public Outrage
Counterinsurgencies operate covertly out of tactical necessity. This lack of transparency
with Phoenix and drones allowed misguided policies to go largely unchecked. Secrecy enabled
corruption.
The corruption which pervaded Phoenix is a testament to the appeal of capitalism in a
war against communism. Phung Hoang agents falsely arrested and imprisoned civilians simply to
extort bribes from their families.274 Agents were also receptive to bribes from the VCI itself,
releasing legitimate VCI members.275 Informants gave false information simply to be paid.276
These matters weakened the counterinsurgency effort.
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More than corruption occurred. The Paris Peace Accords were signed on January 27,
1973, bringing peace to Vietnam. However, declassified State Department documents reveal that
Phoenix Operations were revived after only two months of inaction and in violation of the
ceasefire. Major General Nguyen Vinh Nghi “directed all sectors to sharply increase intelligence
operations and vigorously root out the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).” Previously, the GVN
had attempted to maintain Phoenix through a semantic shift, pursuing “Disruptors of Domestic
Tranquility,” rather than the VCI. General Nghi’s decree lifted this linguistic veil. Notably,
Saigon insisted Phoenix be revived “without the fanfare and publicity that it used to receive,”
proof that such actions violated the peace agreement.277
Former Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf, revealed that the drone war in Pakistan
was created under questionable means. America’s drone operations outside of official war zones
were predicated on pursuing and executing top Al-Qaeda leadership, whose primary goal is to
harm America. However, in order to pursue Al Qaeda in Pakistan, the CIA made a deal with
Musharraf to begin drone strikes in his country. In 2004 the CIA not only agreed to kill Nek
Muhammed but that Pakistani Intelligence would have a hand in drone strike targeting.
Muhammed was a Pashtun tribal leader unaffiliated with Al-Qaeda who had rebelled against the
Pakistani state. Muhammed flaunted his successes against the Pakistani army, dismissing
Musharraf as an American lackey. The very first drone strike carried out in Pakistan killed
Muhammed, and others in his compound, including two boys ages ten and sixteen. America’s
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drone war in Pakistan thus began with an imprecise strike which killed civilians and was not
directed against anti-American Al Qaeda.278
Despite the covert nature of these programs, details emerged from the media, typically
revealing numerous misdeeds. The revelation of such things led to public outrage. With little to
no information from the government about these programs, the media accounts are accepted as
fact. The end result of this negative media exposure is a loss of confidence in the American
government and distrust in the overall military engagement.
Moyar exerts a great deal of effort in Phoenix and the Birds of Prey to counter false
claims against the Phoenix program. Most of these claims emerged in the anti-war early 1970s,
when Phoenix was exposed. Misinformation about Phoenix’s misdeeds matters because of
Phoenix’s covert nature and the existence of numerous abuses. Disillusioned with the Vietnam
War, the public accepted anything negative. Media revelations and public outrage towards
Phoenix helped bring on Congressional and Senate hearings. Phoenix was titillating enough a
subject for a Penthouse article, “The Phoenix Murders” in the December 1975 issue.279
Despite the mistreatment of the Vietnamese, in Phoenix and the larger war effort, the
American anti-war movement was primarily driven by anger at American deaths.280 Since the
early days of UAVs, avoiding the loss of American life has been the main appeal of their use.
Until recently, the relative safety drones provided Americans helped spur their popularity. In
February 2012, a Washington Post and ABC News poll found that eighty-three percent of
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Americans approved the use of drones against terrorists overseas.281 Opinion is shifting. Just a
year later, March 2013, a Gallup poll reveals that overall support for drone use outside of the US
dropped to sixty-five percent.282
The second poll was conducted shortly after Kentucky Senator Rand Paul carried out a
thirteen hour filibuster on drone policy. Paul’s main goal was to illicit a guarantee from President
Obama that drone strikes would not be used to target Americans on domestic soil.283 The issue
was raised largely because at least four American citizens have been killed by drone strikes. The
most significant shift in the poll results concerned whether Americans should be targeted for
drone strikes in other countries. In 2012, seventy-nine percent of those who supported drone use
endorsed targeting Americans in other countries.284 In 2013, after Paul’s filibuster, only fortyone percent approved.285
A letter from Attorney General Eric Holder admits the four deaths, noting that only one
of the four Americans, Anwar Al-Aulaqi, was specifically targeted.286 This is both comforting
and disturbing. The Obama administration’s execution of Anwar Al-Aulaqi inhabits a legal grey
area because it denied him his right to due process. As an active Al-Qaeda leader, his targeting is
understandable if not justified. However, the death of the other three Americans demonstrates the
imprecision of drone strikes. One of the others was sixteen year old Abdulrahman Al-Aulaqi,
Anwar Al-Aulaqi’s son. The strike which killed Abdulrahman was supposed to target Egyptian
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Al-Qaeda operative Ibrahim al-Banna at a restaurant in Shabwa, Yemen. The intelligence was
mistaken, and al-Banna was not there. Instead, a dozen men were killed, including Abdulrahman,
who had no connection to terrorism. Thus, intelligence issues caused imprecision and civilian
death.287 The ACLU has filed a lawsuit on behalf of the four dead Americans against former CIA
director Leon Panetta.288
Popular support for America’s drone counterinsurgency has dropped drastically, but a
sixty-five percent approval rating is still a significant majority.289 Military thinkers, such as
David Kilcullen, critique America’s drone policy in Pakistan, but advocate a traditional
counterinsurgency: “Stabilizing Pakistan will require a focus on securing areas, principally in
Punjab and Sindh, that are still under government control, while building up police and civil
authorities and refocusing aid on economic development, security and governance.”290 Vietnam
and Phoenix have taught us this does not work.
Covert counterinsurgencies deny the populace of a Democratic society its right to check
the actions of those in power. Misdeeds inevitably occur in war, but attempts to evade guilt did
not succeed for those involved in Phoenix or in charge of drone policy. Media revelations
concerning Phoenix abuses spurred public outrage, resulting in Congressional and Senate
hearings. President Obama did not officially acknowledge America’s drone program until May
2013, long after media revelations, NGOs, and victims had spoken out about wrongdoings. The
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secrecy governments adopt when engaged in questionable covert-operations breeds distrust and
anti-war sentiment.
Counterinsurgencies waged against amorphous ideologies, whether Communism or
Terrorism, have proven to be misguided. These ideological wars happened because America felt
threatened; in order for an ideology to be threatening, it needs followers. The devotion of these
followers certainly varies in intensity, increasing after the devastation caused by American
military action. In addition to being misguided, America’s counterinsurgencies have proven to be
inefficient and self-defeating. They run counter to American Strategic Culture which prefers
short, limited, and decisive conflicts. They seek to eradicate a group, but end up replenishing it.
They try to protect innocent life but frequently end it. They win few hearts and minds, all while
expending American resources and lives.

89

CONCLUSION:
THE BIRTH OF A DRONE WORLD
It has taken nearly a century for America to become a drone nation. A major finding of
this thesis is that drones are not new, and that one must learn from their overlooked past. The
recent growth of drones in significance is undeniable. Other nations recognize this and are
progressing quickly.
America pays close attention to foreign drone development. Though American drones
have seen the most significant deployment, other nations are not far behind. The Italian Air
Force already uses Predator drones.291 Another American drone, Northup Grumman’s Global
Hawk, was redubbed the Euro Hawk and sold to Germany.292 Politics and expense, however,
ended this particular foreign drone pursuit.293 Israel has already engaged in its own deadly drone
strikes.294 In 2009, Russia reportedly spent fifty million dollars on Israeli drones to reverse
engineer and improve their existing fleet.295 Iran has recovered American drones which crashed
while likely monitoring Iranian nuclear development. Though embarrassing, most doubt Iran’s
ability to reverse engineer the technology.296 According to Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan
Nasrallah, Iran did provide the components to a surveillance drone which the politico-militant
organization deployed over Israel in 2012, before it was shot down. The leader of Israel’s Air
291
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Force, Major-General Shachar Shohat, warned that the nation would have to defend against
Hezbollah and Hamas’ weaponized drones soon.297
All of these efforts pale in comparison to China’s pursuit of UAV technology. Chinese
drone development is nothing new, though efforts have certainly increased in recent years.
American defense contractors that develop drones are a primary target of China’s ongoing
cyberwar.298 The US Justice Department indicted five members of the Chinese military in its
first-ever hacking charges against a foreign country. Though the charges relate to trade, not
military secrets, they set a precedent for future indictments.299
Xu Guangyu, a retired Major General who directs China’s Arms Control and
Disarmament Association, told a New York Times reporter that China would increase its drone
use. He coyly noted that America’s drones were technologically superior, saying “We can only
envy their technology. Right now, we’re learning from them.” China, however, has clearly
progressed.300 Chinese manufacturers are offering cheap knockoffs to other nations.301 A copy of
the Predator drone called the Wing Loong (Pterodactyl) exists and has reportedly been exported
to other nation’s arsenals.302
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Fig. 16. China’s Wing Loong drone modeled on the American Predator drone.303
China’s drone deployment is telling. China seeks drones capable of fighting in contested
maritime space. Drones were deployed during territorial disputes with Japan. Most American
drones, like the Predator, are designed to operate in unopposed air space.304 Liu Yuejin, director
of China’s Ministry of Public Security’s antidrug bureau, revealed plans to execute a murderous
drug lord with armed drones; he was captured instead.305 The thought of using lethal drones
domestically has already alarmed some Americans. The surveillance capabilities of drones are
also of great interest to the Chinese police state.
America’s drone use has damaged its moral standing. Writing about America’s use of
torture, Alfred W. McCoy notes the negative impact of American wrongdoing, saying “The state,
in all its majesty, must uphold the law and the highest standards of the human community. The
state, particularly one that aspires to world leadership, is not only an enforcer; it is an
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exemplar.”306 When the world’s only superpower ignores or selectively chooses when and where
to follow international law and abide by human rights, it weakens the world’s ability to regulate
the abusive actions of other nations.
America’s drone policy has led to formal international condemnation. China, frequently
criticized for its human rights violations, has used America’s questionable actions in rebuttal. A
report, issued by the State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, points
specifically to the civilian casualties caused by drone strikes.307 The United Nations Human
Rights Council investigated the civilian casualties caused by American drone strikes, calling for
independent investigations, oversight, and transparency.308
The apparent solution to these problems is binding international guidelines and
regulation. In the past, the rise of unregulated, revolutionary war technology drastically changed
history. During World War I, Germany’s unrestricted submarine warfare ruined President
Woodrow Wilson’s hopes for neutrality, and led America into the conflict. Nuclear weapons
brought an end to World War II in the Pacific, but also ushered in a decades-long arms race
which threatened world destruction. Surely, the replacement of man with machines is as
revolutionary a change to war as has ever been seen. The fear of fully-autonomous lethal drones,
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though not yet developed, has already brought condemnation from the United Nations and
Human Rights Watch.309
Binding international regulation of drones is unlikely. Examining the history of drones
reveals a repeated warping of the American experience in War. Drone use has been secretive,
costly, immoral, inefficient, and counter-productive. In the past, the problems drones faced were
recognized, resulting in suspension. The Kettering Bug was halted because of cost and
inaccuracy. Operation Aphrodite’s drones also had accuracy problems, harming civilians in a
manner contrary to America’s strategic bombing doctrine. The problems were recognized; the
program was stopped. Drones rarely succeeded during the Cold War. The sole exception, the
Lightning Bug, proved unworthy of support once the Vietnam War ended and covert funding
dried up. Contemporary drones have seen the most significant use and have caused the most
significant problems. Their covert use breeds distrust. It allows those in power to sidestep
Congressional approval for war. Contemporary policy has focused primarily on terrorist
assassination. Drone advocates downplay problems such as inadequate intelligence, inaccuracy,
and civilian casualties. Predator and Reaper drones not only produce dead terrorists but anger,
resulting in greater extremist recruitment. The fault lies not with drones, which are simply tools,
but with misguided policy. The past suggests a solution: recognition of limitations and
suspension of misguided policy.
The reliance on drones to fight wars reveals what drone critics term the “schizophrenic
ease of remote killing.”310 The relative ease of drone warfare, lacking troop deployment,
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avoiding American casualties, and costing mere money, makes waging war too easy. Without a
meaningful deterrent to war, America may prove too willing to destroy. Drone operators,
however, whose job is compared to playing video games, insist they recognize the reality of what
they are doing.311 UAV pilots have developed mental illnesses like Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder.312 While drones remove troops from combat, killing people, even from across the
world, still takes a toll. Though the mental anguish of those pulling the trigger is genuine, the
suffering of the people receiving missile strikes is more significant. In a speech on drone policy,
President Obama has acknowledged that using UAVs is “shielding our government from the
public scrutiny that a troop deployment invites. It can also lead a President and his team to view
drone strikes as a cure-all for terrorism.”313 As individuals are replaced by remotely-controlled
war machines, accountability fades.
For nearly one hundred years, drones have offered the prospect of removing soldiers from
combat. Whether this is all for the good is questionable. Drones present a paradox. They save
soldiers’ lives. If American lives were being lost, however, flawed American action would face
greater criticism. Our counterinsurgency in Pakistan would not be happening were drones not
replacing troops. Neither Pakistan nor the American populace would allow a ground invasion.
America’s problematic drone policy allows for: war minus the necessary prerequisites (public
debate, Congressional approval, adherence to international law) or requisite consequences. A
310
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final aspect of the paradox is that it reduces the number of people who are well equipped to
contemplate war, those with a horror of war’s brutality.
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